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Abstract
Stress testing is a macro–prudential analytical method of assessing the financial
system’s resilience to adverse events. This thesis describes the methodology of
the stress tests and illustrates the stress testing for credit and market risks on
the real bank–by–bank data in the two Balkan countries: Croatia and Serbia.
Credit risk is captured by the macroeconomic credit risk models that estimate
the default rates of the corporate and the household sectors. Setting–up the
framework for the countries that were not much covered in former studies and
that face the limited availability of data has been the main challenge of the
thesis. The outcome can help to reveal possible risks to financial stability. The
methods described in the thesis can be further developed and applied to the
emerging markets that suffer from the similar data limitations.
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Abstrakt
Za´teˇzˇove´ testova´n´ı je metoda makroekonomicke´ analy´zy, ktera´ hodnot´ı odol-
nost financˇn´ıho syste´mu proti neprˇ´ıznivy´m uda´lostem. Tato pra´ce popisuje
metodiku za´teˇzˇovy´ch test˚u a ilustruje za´teˇzˇove´ testova´n´ı pro u´veˇrove´ a trzˇn´ı
riziko na skutecˇny´ch datech jednotlivy´ch bank ve dvou balka´nsky´ch zemı´ch:
Chorvatsku a Srbsku. U´veˇrove´ riziko je vyja´drˇene´ pomoc´ı makroekonomicke´ho
modelu kreditn´ıho rizika, ktery´ odhaduje mı´ry defaultu pro podnikovy´ sektor
a sektor doma´cnost´ı. Hlavn´ım u´kolem pra´ce je sestaven´ı ra´mce za´teˇzˇove´ho
testova´n´ı pro zemeˇ, ktere´ nebyly prˇ´ıliˇs uvazˇova´ny v drˇ´ıveˇjˇs´ıch studi´ıch a pro
ktere´ jsou data dostupna´ jen v omezene´ mı´ˇre. Vy´sledek pra´ce mu˚zˇe pomoci
odhalit mozˇna´ rizika financˇn´ı stability. Metody pouzˇite´ v te´to pra´ci mohou by´t
da´le rozv´ıjeny a aplikova´ny na rozv´ıjej´ıc´ı se ekonomiky, ktere´ cˇel´ı obdobne´mu
omezen´ı v datech.
Klasifikace JEL: E37, G21, G28
Kl´ıcˇova´ slova: bankovnictv´ı, kreditn´ı rizoko, makroeko-
nomicke´ za´teˇzˇove´ testova´n´ı, mı´ra defaultu,
trzˇn´ı riziko
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Topic characteristics Nowadays, financial stability of the banking sectors is
a highly discussed topic. Especially, the assessment of the appropriate amount
of capital that banks should put aside to guard against various types of risks
that banks face represents a great challenge. One of the techniques that help
to bring the answer to the question whether a particular bank or a banking
sector have sufficient capital buffer in the case of a crisis is the stress testing.
A stress testing is a risk management tool that shows the bank’s or the
banking sector’s financial performance under downside scenarios which are se-
vere but still plausible. By comparing the results under these scenarios with the
baseline (most likely future scenario) results and with minimum capital require-
ments, the banks’ management and national supervisors can specify additional
capital to be set aside.
In July 2010, the results of the EU–wide stress testing exercise were released.
The results showed the overall EU banking sector as a resilient to particular
shocks. In the light of the proceeding preparations for the EU enlargement
to the Balkans this thesis focuses on vulnerabilities of four banking sectors in
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia and Serbia. The author is going
to assess banking systems’ performance using stress testing framework under
the two scenarios: the baseline and the adverse scenario, which will be specified
for each country in a conservative manner. The outcome should demonstrate
whether these countries are able to withstand an economic deterioration.
Hypotheses H1: The stress testing methodology for the Balkan countries
based on publicly available data can be build up.
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H2: Some banks show insufficient capital adequacy under the baseline sce-
nario.
H3: Some banks show insufficient capital adequacy under the adverse sce-
nario.
H4: The stress testing–exercise can reveal different risks to financial stability
across examined countries.
Methodology A top–down stress–testing approach will be applied. Each
banking sector will be tested separately and will be roughly represented by
10 major banks (in the terms of the amount of assets compared to the total
sector’s assets) that operate in the country–independently of whether they are
state–owned, domestic or foreign banks–and that represent at least 50% of the
total sector’s assets.
The baseline scenario will be either based on the Consensus Forecast and
the IMF World Economic Outlook or simple VAR model will be employed.
The adverse scenario will be rather the expert–based using as well the historic
volatility for calibration. In particular, many parameters will be determined
by expert judgement according to the unstable situations in 90’s and at the
beginning of the 21st century. The key macroeconomic indicators as GDP,
interest rate, exchange rate etc. will be considered. One year forecast horizon
will be used for both scenarios.
The regression analysis using historical data from the World Bank Database
and the National Banks’ databases will be used to link macroeconomic variables
to micro–prudential indicators. Finally, the corresponding capital buffer will
be calculated using the banking balance sheets data.
The comparison of the calculated capital adequacy for each bank and bank-
ing sector with the existing capital requirements will be made and possible
threats to the financial stability will be discussed. We will further focus on the
key source of risk for these countries and discuss possible policy implications.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The launch of the Financial Stability Assessment Program (FSAP) by the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB) in 1999 es-
tablished the macro stress tests as part of the financial stability toolbox and
brought them to the forefront of interest of the national regulators and super-
visors. Moreover, in light of the recent financial crisis, the stress tests that
can quantify potential impact of the adverse events on the economy are highly
discussed topics. Generally, the macro stress tests measure the risk exposure
of the financial system to the severe but plausible shock. In that case they can
help national authorities to reveal financial system’s vulnerabilities. Central
banks have usually their own stress–testing models and revise them on regular
basis. So far, there is no consensus on how they should be set and how the
results should be interpreted. The main challenge is how to set the stress tests
in order to capture reality in the most appropriate fashion. In most cases we
are constrained by data availability and computation complexity.
Several studies have been already published, both theoretical and empirical
ones. The surveys try to deal with the stress–testing limitations and demon-
strate the application of the stress tests on the hypothetical or the real financial
sectors. While financial systems of the developed countries are subjects to con-
tinuous assessment, the emerging markets has not been endowed with such an
attention, yet. The emerging markets tend to be sensitive to various economic
shocks. Also, the significant part of the international investments goes there,
thus the assessment of their financial health is of high importance. This thesis
aims to analyse the financial stability using the stress tests in the Balkan coun-
tries. Initially, we planned to assess four countries: Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Croatia, Macedonia and Serbia. Being restricted by data limitations, especially
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by short time series that are essential for the econometric part of the study, we
conduct the exercise only for the Croatian and the Serbian banking sectors.
The objective of the thesis is to investigate following hypotheses: (1) The
stress tests for selected countries can be built up on the basis of publicly avail-
able data. (2) Some banks show insufficient capital adequacy under the baseline
scenario. (3) Some banks show insufficient capital adequacy under the adverse
scenario. (4) The stress tests can reveal risks to financial stability in the selected
countries. To analyse our hypotheses we identify the relevant set of institutions
that will be considered in both countries. Then, we design the baseline and
the stress scenarios for the one year horizon and quantify their impact on the
financial sector solvency by integrating the analysis of multiple risk factors into
a probability distribution of aggregate losses. From the range of risks that can
be examined we focus on the credit and the market risks. While the market
risk is relatively easy to calculate, the credit risk, which is the main risk that
financial institution faces, deserves a greater attention. Before the simulation
of the impact of the particular stress scenario on the credit risk exposure, we
usually need to link the macroeconomic variables with the relevant credit risk
measures via so–called satellite models. Generally, there are two approaches
how to build such model, Merton (1974) approach and Wilson (1997a,b) ap-
proach. The latter is employed in this study. We apply the aggregate results of
the stress tests on the individual banks’ portfolios and interpret the outcome.
At the end, we calculate the potential feedback effects in terms of the fiscal
costs.
The thesis is structured as follows: Chapter 2 provides an overview of re-
lated literature. Chapter 3 describes the general theoretical background of the
stress tests. Chapter 4 develops the macroeconomic credit risk models for the
corporate and the household sectors for each country that serve as satellite
models in the stress testing. Chapter 5 consists of the specification of the
scenarios and the stress–testing analysis. Chapter 6 shows the results of the
stress tests on the individual banks. Chapter 7 concludes and discusses possible
future research.
Chapter 2
Related Literature
In the last ten years, several studies that deal with the macro stress–testing
theory or its empirical application have been published. As a part of the
financial stability assessment, the macro stress tests were introduced in the
FSAP 1999, joint program of the IMF and the WB (see i.e. IMF & WB
2003). After the introduction of the FSAP, national regulators and supervisors
started to incorporate the stress tests into their periodical financial stability
assessments. Several studies highlight the usefulness of the stress tests in the
macro–prudential analysis. For example, Borio, Furfine & Lowe (2001) point
out the importance of the stress tests in improving the understanding of the risk
and its relationship with the business cycle. One of the largest stress–testing
exercise was conducted by the legal authorities in the EU and the USA after
the recent financial crisis in order to evaluate the current conditions of their
financial systems (Fed 2009a,b and CEBS 2010a,b).
The discussion about the objectives, the modelling process and the chal-
lenges of the macro stress tests can be found in Drehmann (2008). Sorge &
Virolainen (2006) discuss the two main approaches to the stress testing, the
econometric analysis of the balance–sheet data (balance–sheet models) and the
Value–at –Risk (VaR) models, applying both of them to the Finish economy.
In the balance–sheet models the macro variables are linked with the balance–
sheet items. The obtained coefficients are then used to simulate the impact of
some shock to the system. The VaR models combine the risk factor analysis
with the estimation of the distribution of loss, providing the quantification of
the portfolio sensitivity to the several sources of risk. Cˇiha´k (2007) elaborated
a comprehensive framework that concerns on the design of the stress tests and
the scenarios, assuming the wide range of risks. He provides the illustration
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of possible stress–testing application to the bank’s data. The paper discusses
strengths and weaknesses of the several methods and provides the summarisa-
tion of the stress tests conducted by the national regulators and supervisors.
Sorge (2004) provides an overview of the methodologies for the stress–testing of
the financial systems, with discussion about the methodological challenges such
as the measure of the endogenous risk or the correlation between the credit and
the market risks. Berkowitz (2000) discusses namely the choice of the proper
scenario under which the stress test is conducted.
Regarding the empirical studies, most of them consider the credit risk when
they exercise the macro stress tests. Before the simulation of the impact of the
stress scenario on the credit risk exposure is run, the linkage of the macroe-
conomic variables (GDP growth, interest rates, unemployment, industrial pro-
duction, inflation etc.) with the relevant credit risk measures via the satellite
models should be investigated. There are several approaches for setting up such
models, usually called macro credit risk models. Drehmann (2005) and Cˇiha´k
(2007) highlight, among others a non–linear relationship between the macroe-
conomic shocks and the credit risk in the macroeconomic credit risk models.
Some studies develop the Merton–type macro credit risk models based on the
modelling of the asset return in order to estimate the default rate. Merton
(1974) originally designed the model to price several types of financial instru-
ments. The idea of the Merton–type model is to define the default event as a
fall of the asset return below the defined threshold. Latent–factor model of the
Merton’s type for the Czech economy is used in Jakub´ık (2007). Jakub´ık &
Schmieder (2008) model the default rate that is measured by the inflow of the
non–performing loans (NPLs). The model was applied to the household and
the corporate sectors for the Czech Republic and Germany. Hamerle, Liebig
& Scheule (2004) use the factor–model, based on the Basel II approach for
forecasting the default probabilities of the individual borrowers in Germany.
The Merton–type model is used in Drehmann (2005) for the stress testing of
the corporate exposures of the banks in the UK.
Other studies follow the approach originally introduced by Wilson (1997a,b).1
Wilson’s model is one of the few models that explicitly links the default rate
with the macroeconomic variables and it is base on the relatively simple logistic
function that is used in the regression analysis. It was empirically shown that
the non–linear logistic functions are more suitable for analysing the relation-
ships in the model than the linear functions. Also Cˇiha´k (2007) suggests the
1Model known as CreditPortfolioView®, developed for McKinsey & Company.
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logistic model for estimating the inputs to the stress test modelling. Wilson–
type model is employed in Boss (2002) and Boss et al. (2006) who estimate
the relationship between the macroeconomic variables and the credit risk for
the corporate default rate in the Austrian banking sector. Boss et al. (2009)
discuss the update of the Austrian National Bank’s macro stress–testing model.
Virolainen (2004) and Jokivuolle, Virolainen & Va¨ha¨maa (2008) develop the
macroeconomic credit risk model that estimates the probability of default in
various industries as the function of the macroeconomic variables for the Finish
economy. Similarly, our study is based on the logistic credit risk model of the
Wilson’s type.
Apart from the studies discussed above, there are several other surveys
that investigate the relationship between the macro variables and the banks’
balance–sheet items. Baboucˇek & Jancˇar (2005) employ the vector autoregres-
sion model (VAR) using the NPLs and the macroeconomic factors for the Czech
Republic. Pesola (2005) investigates the macroeconomic factors that influence
the banking sector’s loan loss rate in the Nordic countries, Germany, Belgium,
the UK, Greece and Spain using the panel–data regression on the data from
early 1980’s to 2002. Evjen et al. (2005) analyse the effects of the monetary
responses to supply and demand side shocks on the banks’ losses in Norway
and discuss how the stress tests can be incorporated into the monetary policy
decision–making. Also they present their stress–testing results in terms of the
loan losses.
Some studies aim to incorporate more sources of risks into the model. One
of the earlier studies is Barnhill, Papapanagiotou & Schumacher (2000). The
authors measure the correlated market and credit risks and apply the results
to the hypothetical South African banks, linking the changes in the financial
conditions to the banks’ capital ratios. Study of Van den End, Hoeberichts &
Tabbae (2006) describes the multivariate scenario analysis (deterministic and
stochastic) and the stress tests used by the Dutch Central Bank. The study
estimates the probability of default (PD) and the loss given default (LGD)
employing the logistic function, and models both the credit risk and the interest
rate risk. Also Drehmann, Sorensen & Stringa (2008) estimate the integrated
impact of the credit and the interest rate risks on the banks’ portfolios, assessing
the banks’ economic value, the future earnings and the capital adequacy. They
expand the analysis of the interest rate risk and the default risk on the liabilities
and the off–balance sheet items. Peura & Jokivuolle (2003) measure the capital
adequacy by simulating the difference between the bank’s actual capital and
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the minimum capital requirements and they determine whether the estimated
bank’s capital buffer is sufficient over the business cycles. The Bank of England
works on the model of the systemic risk called RAMSI (Risk Assessment Model
for Systemic Institutions), which incorporates the credit risk, the interest and
the non–interest income risk, the network interactions and the feedback effects.
The RAMSI model tries to eliminate some of the limitations of the macro
stress–testing models. Study of Aikman et al. (2009) discusses the introduction
of the liability–side feedbacks affects in the systemic risk model and how these
feedbacks can lead to higher system instability under the RAMSI model.
Chapter 3
Theoretical Background
3.1 Role of Stress Tests in the Financial Stability
Analysis
Stress testing is the technique used both by banks’ risk managers and financial
sectors’ regulators and supervisors to assess the vulnerabilities of the particular
bank or the whole financial system under the severe but plausible shocks. In
1999, the Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP), the joint project of
the IMF and the World Bank, was launched. The stress testing was included
in the program. As a part of the FSAP, the stress tests have been recognised
by the regulators and the supervisors as the standard tools in the financial
stability analysis.
Our study concerns on the stress testing of the financial systems, commonly
known as the “macro” stress testing. The macroeconomic forecasting, the early
warning systems and the macro stress tests come under the financial system’
toolbox for assessing the financial stability and its threats and strengths. The
macroeconomic forecasting is based largely on the analyses of the historical
macroeconomic data in order to project the most likely future performance of
the economy. The macroeconomic forecasting models can be used also in the
stress testing as a part of the scenario analysis. The early warning systems and
the stress tests differ from the macroeconomic forecasting, as they focus on
unlikely but plausible events. Both methods aim to generate ex ante warnings
about the possible problems that might appear in the future. The early warning
systems consist of the indicators that can help to estimate the probability of an
unlikely crisis. Firstly, they define the crisis by setting up the threshold values
for the relevant macroeconomic variables that have to be exceeded, and then
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they estimate the probability of the breakdown of the thresholds. The early
warning models are usually based on the historical data. The stress testing
can be based either on the historical data or on the hypothetical scenarios.
It simulates some severe adverse but plausible situation in order to assess the
vulnerability of the financial system under this situation. It does not analyse
the probability of such crisis but its consequences for the financial stability.
Detailed discussion about the monitoring systems is provided i.e. in Sahajwala
& Van den Bergh (2000). The following chapter aims to provide the theoretical
background of the stress–testing methods.
3.2 Building Blocks of Stress–testing Models
The macro stress tests measure the risk exposure of the financial institutions (or
the selected group of financial institutions) to unlikely stress events. Their goal
is to help the regulators and the supervisors to identify system vulnerabilities
and overall risk exposures that can lead to the problems with the financial
stability. The macro stress–testing framework can be described as follows:
Firstly, we assume some shock to the economy. Using the macroeconomic
model we link the shock to the macroeconomic variables such as GDP, interest
rates, inflation etc.1 The assumed macroeconomic variables are then linked to
the banks’ balance–sheet data through the satellite models. Then, we map the
effect of the shock into the banks’financial performance and we estimate the
possible impacts in terms of i.e. minimum capital adequacy ratio (CAR)
Formally, the stress–testing models can be written as follows (see Sorge
2004, pp. 3–4):
Ω
(
Y˜t+1/X˜t+1 ≥ X¯
)
= f(X t, Zt) (3.1)
where X t is the set of past realisations of the macroeconomic variables
X, Zt is the set of past realisations of the other relevant factors, Y˜t+1 is the
measure of distress for the financial system, X˜t+1 ≥ X¯ is the condition for
stress test scenario to occur, Y˜t+1/X˜t+1 ≥ X¯ is the uncertain future realisation
of a measure of distress in the event of the shock, Ω(.) is the risk metric used
to compare financial system vulnerability across institutions and scenarios and
1Sometimes, the macroeconomic models are not available. In that case we can employ
vector autoregression (VAR) or vector error correction models or we can simply use the his-
torical observations during the periods of the distress or we can expertly judge the movements
of the macro variables.
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f(.) is the loss function that maps the initial set of shocks to the final impact
measured on the financial sector’s portfolio. It links the changes in the macro
variables and the overall financial distress.
The starting point when we model the stress tests is to define the scope of
the analysis (objectives, set of institutions or portfolios to be analysed, expo-
sures and risk measures and data–generating process). The exposures are given
by the set of exogenous systematic risk factors. The data–generating process
of systematic risk factors finds the interdependences among these factors and
across the time. Accordingly, the impact of the factors on the risk measure of
the exposures is captured. The stress–testing scenarios are applied when the
model is set up. After designing and calibrating the scenario we estimate the
direct impact of the scenario on the balance–sheet items. The new approaches
try to evaluate the possible feedback effects both on the financial system and
the real economy (i.e. in terms of fiscal costs).
3.2.1 Bottom–up vs. Top–down Approach
There are two approaches how to set up the macroeconomic stress tests. In
the bottom–up macro stress tests, the supervisor (i.e. central bank) sets the
assumptions about the future economic conditions for the stress tests and ap-
proves the individual bank’s internal models and other assumptions for running
the test. The stress test itself is conducted by the banks and the supervisor
collects the results afterwards. In the top–down approach, the supervisor not
only sets up the conditions but also conducts the stress test, applying the same
assumptions, procedures and models on all banks.2.
As an example of the bottom–up approach is the recent stress–testing exer-
cise of the Fed (2009a,b). The banks were provided with the basic assumptions
and their internal methods were subject to the approval of the Fed. Neverthe-
less, the banks themselves conducted the exercise and provided the supervisor
with the results, which were then summarised and published. The top–down
approach can be found i.e. in Sorge & Virolainen (2006). Some central banks
use the combination of both approaches, for example the Dutch Central Bank
(see Van den End, Hoeberichts & Tabbae 2006).
The top–down and the bottom–up approaches have their pros and cons.
The main advantage of the top–down approach is that the same assumptions
and models are applied to all banks, which allow for the comparison. Also, the
2See Cˇiha´k (2007) and Jakub´ık & Sutton (2011).
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network linkages can be captured. The disadvantage of the top–down approach
is that conducting the stress tests on the system’s level can lead to the loss of
some relevant information, being this confidential or too complex to be captured
by the supervisor. The bottom–up approach can capture complexities better
and usually does not suffer from the data limitations because the detailed data
on the individual debtors are available in the banks. The disadvantage is that
the individual banks’ results need not to be comparable as the banks possess the
certain level of freedom in choosing the models and the methods in the exercise.
Also the supervisor might not be able to control the consistent implementing of
the assumptions that were provided, especially in the large financial systems.
Moreover, the summarisation of the individual banks’ outcomes can neglect the
important interdependencies among the institutions.
3.2.2 Objectives
Drehmann (2008) identifies three main objectives of the stress tests: (1) the
validation–to assess the risks and the portfolio’s vulnerabilities, (2) the decision
making–the test results can help in the business decisions and planning, and
(3) the communication–the results can describe the overall situation in the
financial institution or the whole sector and can be presented to the target
audience. As Drehmann argues, the objectives are essential for designing the
models. If our main target is to validate the situation and to make decision
according to results of the model, this model should be accurate and with the
good forecasting performance (the use of robust econometric techniques and
structural models might be appropriate). But if we run the model and we
want to present the results to the public, which may not be involved in the
process, the model and its results should be transparent, easy to understand
and tractable (reduced–form models are more appropriate).
Before the model is set, the group of relevant financial institutions, which
we want to analyse, should be defined. Capturing the whole financial sector is
more comprehensive, but usually very difficult as it is a complex task. Mod-
ellers frequently choose the large banking institutions that are relevant for the
stability of the system. Sometimes, the distinction between the state–owned,
the private and the foreign banks is done (see Cˇiha´k 2007). The banks can
be grouped by their size (large, medium–sized or small banks) or performance
(strong banks and weak banks). Next step is to define the relevant portfolio for
measuring the risk exposures (trading books or banking books). Sometimes the
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data limitations lead to the creation of the hypothetical portfolios that simu-
late the distribution of assets and risk exposures. Some models distinguish the
exposures by the debtor’s classes (consumer loans, interbank loans, corporate
loans further divided by industrial sectors), see for example Boss (2002), Sorge
& Virolainen (2006) or Jakub´ık & Schmieder (2008).
3.2.3 Exposures
The objectives of the stress test determine the choice of exposures. Ideally,
the model would capture the whole financial system and would assess its most
important risks. Given the data and the model limitations (the models are
able to capture the real world only in a reduced form) this task is difficult
to accomplish. Usually, we choose only the part of the system and we make
simplifying assumptions in order to create the model and run the test. The
common approach is to test the banking system because it usually counts for
the major part of the financial system, and as Drehmann (2008, p. 67) argues
“because of its pivotal role in the transformation of savings into investments
and, hence, its position in transmitting financial system shocks back to the real
economy”. Some authors test also the other sectors of the financial system.
For discussion about the modelling of the insurance and the pension sectors
see Cˇiha´k (2007).
The major part of the stress–testing models copes with the risk within the
national system. Stress testing of the single financial system benefits from
better data availability, and can provide the implications for the monetary
policy decision–making. Some studies focus on the international macro stress–
testing models. Pesaran et al. (2006) developed the model where the asset
values of the credit portfolio are linked to the dynamic global macro model.
Table 3.1 summarises the risks to which the financial institutions can be
exposed. So far, the majority of studies focused on the credit risk (Drehmann
2005, Pesaran et al. 2006 or Jakub´ık & Schmieder 2008). However, some
authors try to incorporate more risks into the stress–testing model. Drehmann
et al. (2008) incorporate the credit and the interest rate risks and estimate
their impact on the banking system. Cˇiha´k (2007) runs the stress–testing
model to assess the vulnerabilities of the hypothetical banking system, using
several risks, which have been analysed separately. Nevertheless, for the more
realistic forecasting the correlation of the risk factors should be evaluated. The
measures of the correlated market and credit risks can be found in Barnhill,
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Table 3.1: Risks modelled in the stress testing
Credit risk The creditor’s risk of losses arising from the bor-
rower’s failure to meet his obligations defined by
the contract.
Market risk The risk of losses in balance sheet (and off–balance
sheet) positions arising from the movements in
market prices (stock prices, interest rates, foreign
exchange rates, commodity prices).
Liquidity risk The risk that an institution will be unable to meet
its obligations when they fall due without experi-
encing significant losses or to sell position without
losses because of insufficient market depth.
Contagion risk The risk that the failure of one or more institu-
tions will negatively affect financial performance
of other institutions.
Concentration
risk
The risk of losses arising from the uneven distri-
bution of exposures to an institution’s debtors (or
to sectors, products etc.).
Source: CEBS (2009b) and Cˇiha´k (2007).
Papapanagiotou & Schumacher (2000) or Van den End, Hoeberichts & Tabbae
(2006).
So far, the stress tests focused mainly on the asset side of the balance sheet.
The liabilities side is, however, essential for modelling the liquidity risk (matu-
rity mismatch between the assets and the liabilities can cause serious problems
with the liquidity for the bank) and for analysing net interest income. Simi-
larly, the off–balance sheet positions are important when calculating exchange
rate risk losses.
3.2.4 Risk Measures
The assessment of the risks to the financial sector can be done through the
simple indicators, i.e. the Financial Soundness Indicators (FSIs), or through
the stress testing.3. The FSIs are based on the balance–sheet and the income–
statement data, the information about the ownership structure and the linkages
between the institutions (for example, non–performing loans (NPLs), loan loss
3Cˇiha´k (2007) considers also the individual banks’ z–scores, which are directly linked to
the probability of banks’ insolvency.
3. Theoretical Background 13
provisions (LLPs), return on assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE), net open
positions in foreign exchange etc.). The FSIs provide the overall picture of the
soundness of the banks and the financial sectors. The overview of the finan-
cial soundness indicators, as were defined by the International Monetary Fund
(IMF), is provided in Table A.1 and A.2 in Appendix A. Table A.1 shows the
core FSIs. They cover only the banking sector and are essential to assess its
financial stability. Table A.2 summarises the additional FSIs that cover data
on the other financial institutions and the relevant market participants (house-
holds, real estate sector, non–bank financial sector, corporate sector etc.). Each
FSI measures the financial system sensitivity to the specific risk factor (liquid-
ity risk, market risk etc.). In order to assess all system vulnerabilities it should
be appropriate to analyse several FSIs and also the inter–relationships among
them.4
The choice of the risk measures is determined by the objectives of the stress
testing and the considered exposures. Moreover, the variables used as the
measures of the impact of the stress tests are subjects to data limitations.
According to Cˇiha´k (2007), the risk measure should fit two requirements: (1)
the possibility to interpret the variable as the measure of the financial system’s
health, and (2) the credible linkage of the variable to the risk factors. Cˇiha´k
(2007) also provides the overview of the risk measures commonly used in the
stress testing. We will discuss some of them briefly. The list described below
is incomplete as it provides only a few indicators. For more indicators such as
the net interest income, the z–scores or the market–based indicators we refer
to Cˇiha´k (2007).
Capital, capitalisation and capital injection The use of capital as a measure
of effect of the shock is an instinctive approach, arising from the fact that the
impact on solvency results in the changes in capital. The advantage is that
data on capital are usually publicly available for the financial institutions in
developed as well as in developing countries. The disadvantage is that the result
is provided as a number and it might be necessary to compare it to some other
variable in order to assess the impact of the shock. One of the possibilities is to
divide capital by the assets or the risk–weighted assets (RWA). The advantage
of the capital adequacy ratio is that it is the commonly accepted indicator of the
financial health. Another option is to divide the capital by some macroeconomic
factor (i.e. GDP). Such indicator provides direct link to the macroeconomy. In
4For detailed discussion about the FSIs, see IMF (2006).
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our study we use this indicator as a measure of potential fiscal costs from the
banks’ failure under the shock.
Profits and profitability During the “good” times, banks usually create prof-
its. In the case of distress, the profits can serve as the first buffer against losses
before the capital is employed. Accordingly, it could be useful to express the
shock in terms of capital and profits. The disadvantage when estimating the
profits is that often we do not know, what amount of profit would the banks
keep and what amount would distribute. That results in the approximation
of profits by the past values or some other indicators. The measure scaled by
bank’s size (i.e. return on equity or return on assets) allows for the comparison
among the institutions.
Ratings and probabilities of default the ratings and the probabilities of
default (PDs) allow for combining the solvency and the liquidity risks into
a single measure. The indicators are useful as they translated the changes in
variables into the changes in ratings and if we link ratings with PDs, the impact
of shock on the PDs can be estimated.
The banks set the capital against all risks that they face (credit, market,
operational, business risk etc.). Yet, not all of them are included in the stress–
testing model. The indicated capital buffer can be too large since it goes to all
risks but the model considers that it is spent only on the analysed risks. The
aggregation of variables is a problematic issue, too. Testing the aggregate cap-
ital adequacy of the financial system may not reveal significant vulnerabilities
concerning the individual institutions and the whole system. The use of the
size–weighted average can help to assess the risks properly (the insolvency of
a small bank is not alarming for the system as a whole while the big insolvent
players can cause serious system instability through the contagion effect and
can become subjects to policy actions).5
In the stress tests we assume that the market agents are passive when the
shock occurs. That means that we assume they do not change their behaviour in
the light of the crisis. In reality this is not usually valid. In order to maintain
this assumption as realistic as possible we should think carefully about the
time horizon over which the stress tests will be run. The integration of the
endogenous behaviour of the market participants and the policy makers into
5Drehmann (2008, pp. 69–70).
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the model is one of the greatest challenges for the stress–testing development.
We discuss it in detail in Section 3.5.
3.3 Stress–testing Scenario
Another challenge in the stress–testing model is the choice of the scenario.
The adverse scenario should be severe enough to uncover the risks to financial
stability but still plausible. The selected shock can be the univariate shock in
the single risk factor, such as the decline in equity prices. The shock can be also
multivariate, reflecting the change in the various risk factors. The multivariate
scenarios are often more realistic because they allow for the interaction of the
variables. According to Berkowitz (2000) there are four types of scenarios (the
list developed for the models that focus on assessing the robustness of capital):
1) Scenario that simulate the shocks which we believe are more likely to happen
than the observed historical data suggest;
2) Scenario that works with shocks which have never occurred;
3) Scenario that simulate the shocks which represents the possibility of a break-
down of statistical patterns under some circumstances (structural breaks of the
states of the world);
4) Scenario that simulate the shocks that express some structural breaks, which
can occur in the future (i.e. the change of the exchange rate regime).
Cˇiha´k (2007) distinguishes between two ways how to design the consistent
scenario. The first way is the “worst case” approach that answer the question
which scenario has the worst impact on the financial system, with the given
level of plausibility. Alternatively, there is the “threshold approach”, which
for a given impact on the system answers what is the most plausible scenario
that would lead to that impact. Level of plausibility can be set according to
historical observations. Alternatively, scenarios can be drawn from the data–
generating process or some variables can be set expertly.
The extreme historical events are easy to communicate and to implement.
Under the historical scenarios we could estimate the behaviour of the market
participants more properly, because their behaviour could be similar to that
observed in the past. Also, the historical scenarios are severe but plausible, as
they have already happened in the past. Another, and direct, option that utilise
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the historical data is to plot the observed risk factors against the measure of the
financial health of the system (i.e. CAR, NPLs) and to pick the most adverse
combination of the risk factors. This method can, however, lack the consistency
as the identified most stressful observations can be from the completely different
historical periods. The main disadvantage of using the historical scenarios is
that it is uncertain that the same situations would repeat in the future.
For developing scenario through the data–generating process, Drehmann
(2008) identifies four main methods that can be employed: (1) the calibrated
distributions of the unobserved factors, (2) the autoregressive processes for each
underlying macro variable, (3) the reduced form vector autoregressive macro
models, and (4) the structural macro models. Specifically, for the communica-
tion purposes the macro models are more suitable than the modelling of the
unobservable factor. The macro models can show the important macroeco-
nomic transmission channels but can be relatively complex, tool. In turn, the
autoregressive models do not include the interdependences of the systemic risk
factors but, as Van den End, Hoeberichts & Tabbae (2006, p. 3) argue, do not
provide for the economic foundation structure of the scenario. The choice of
the model depends on the objectives of the stress test and on the systematic
risk factors that are assumed.
3.4 Review of the Methodological Approaches to
Macro Stress Testing
The methodology discussed in this section concerns on the top–down approach
to the stress testing. Sorge (2004) and Sorge & Virolainen (2006) distinguish
between the two methodological approaches how the macro stress tests can
be modelled. The first is the “piecewise approach” that considers the balance–
sheet models. These models analyse the direct link between the banks’ account-
ing items (NPLs, LLPs etc.) that measure their vulnerability and the business
cycle (GDP growth, unemployment etc.). Secondly, there is the “integrated
approach” that applies the Value–at–Risk (VaR) models. In the VaR models
the multiple risk factors are combined into the mark–to–market probability
distribution of losses that the financial system could face under the individual
scenario.
The balance–sheet models are widely used in the stress tests. The estimated
coefficients can be employed to simulate the impact of the macro shock on
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Table 3.2: Schematic classification of the macro stress–testing
methodologies.
Model Balance–sheet model Value–at–Risk model
Function Exploring the link between
the banks’ accounting mea-
sures of vulnerability and
the business cycle
Combining the analysis of
multiple risk factors into
a mark–to–market portfolio
loss distribution
Main mod-
elling
Time series or panel data Wilson (1997a,b) macro–
econometric risk models
options Reduced–form or structural
models
Merton (1974) micro–
structural risk models
Pros Intuitive and with low com-
putational burden
Integrates analysis of mar-
ket and credit risks
Broader characterisation of
stress scenario
Simulates shift in entire loss
distribution driven by the
impact of macroeconomic
shocks on individual risk
components
Monetary policy trade–offs Has been applied to capture
non–linear effects of macro
shocks on credit risk
Cons Mostly linear functional
forms have been used
Non–additivity of VaR mea-
sures across institutions
Parameter instability over
longer horizons
Most models so far have fo-
cused on credit risk only,
usually limited to a short–
term horizon
Loan loss provisions and
non–performing loans may
be noisy indicators of credit
risk
Available studies have not
dealt with feedback ef-
fects or parameter instabil-
ity over a longer horizon
No feedback effects
Source: Table adopted from Sorge & Virolainen (2006, p. 118).
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the financial sector. The balance–sheet models can be either the structural
models or the reduced–form models. The VaR models are relatively complex
and combine the multiple risk factors (credit risk, market risk etc.). Table 3.2
shows the schematic classification of the both types of models. Both approaches
are discussed in this section, in line with the studies of Sorge (2004) and Sorge
& Virolainen (2006).
3.4.1 Balance–sheet Models
The balance–sheet models are based on the estimation of the sensitivity of the
balance sheets to the adverse change in the crucial macroeconomic variables.
The estimated coefficients are used to simulate the impact of the hypothetical
scenarios on the financial system. For the balance–sheet models, the Equa-
tion 3.1 can be re–written as follows:
Ω
(
Y˜i,t+1/X˜t+1 ≥ X¯
)
= f(X t, Zti ) (3.2)
where i is the individual portfolio, Y˜i,t+1 is the measure of distress for
the portfolio i in time t + 1 (loan loss provisions, nonperforming loans or
write–offs), X˜t+1 ≥ X¯ is the condition for the stress–testing scenario to occur,
Y˜i,t+1/X˜t+1 ≥ X¯ is the uncertain future realisation of the measure of distress in
the event of the shock, Ω(.) is the risk metric used to forecast the measure of the
distress (Y ) under the assumptions given by the condition X˜t+1 ≥ X¯ and f(.)
is the function of the past realisations of the vector X of the relevant macro
variables (GDP, inflation, interest rates or degree of indebtedness etc.) and
the vector Z of the exogenous bank–specific variables (bank size, capitalization
or cost–efficiency). It links the changes in the macro and the bank–specific
variables and the portfolio’s distress.6
The balance–sheet models can be the models that estimate Equation 3.2
in the reduced form, using either the time–series or the panel data methods,
or the economy–wide structural models. Both of them link the vulnerability
of the system (bank losses) to the changing macro variables.7 The advantage
of the balance–sheet models is that they are intuitive and easy to implement.
On the other hand, they are usually expressed in the linear form, although the
relationship between the banks’ risks and the macro variables is rather non–
6Sorge & Virolainen (2006, pp. 117–119)
7Sorge & Virolainen (2006, p. 119).
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linear.8 Moreover, they frequently investigate the expected losses and do not
consider the whole loss distribution. We provide a brief discussion about the
each type of the balance–sheet model.
Time series models The time series models are suitable for assessing the con-
centration of the system portfolio’s vulnerabilities over time. The most common
measures are the NPLs, the LLPs or the composite indices of the balance–sheet
and the market variables. The loan loss provisions or other variables can be
linked to the macro indicators such as the GDP, the output gap, the unem-
ployment, the inflation, the income, the consumption and the investment, or
the interest and the exchange rates. As an example, for the stress–testing of
the Austrian banking sector, Kalirai & Scheicher (2002) analyse the aggregate
LLPs as the functions of the set of macro variables using the time series model.
Panel data models The panel data models analyse the individual banks’
portfolios or the aggregate banking systems across the countries, evaluating
the role of the bank–specific or the country–specific risk factors. Again, the de-
pendent variables could be the LLPs, the NPLs or the indicators of profitability.
The dependent variables are often not only the functions of the macroeconomic
variables but also of the bank–specific factors (size, portfolio diversification,
specific clients etc.). The cross–sectional dimension enables to evaluate the im-
pact of the shock on the banks’ health according to their specific characteristics
(size or clients’ orientation). Pesola (2005) investigates the macroeconomic fac-
tors that influence the banking sector’s loan loss rate in the Nordic countries,
Germany, Belgium, the UK, Greece and Spain using the panel–data regression.
Structural macro models The structural macro models are able to capture
the complex relationships in the stress testing, and thus can better show the
correlation between the shock and the relevant macro variables or the structural
interdependences. Some authors tried to incorporate the reduced–form Equa-
tion 3.2 in the central banks’ structural macro models. Hoggarth & Whitley
(2003) analyse the impact of the liquidation rates on the write–off rates through
the reduced–form model, whereas the shock to the macroeconomy was analysed
by the macroeconomic model and the structural model linked the macro factors
to the liquidation rates afterwards. De Bandt & Oung (2004) have developed
8For example, Drehmann (2005) found that the systematic factors have non–linear and
non–symmetric impact on the credit risk.
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the similar model for France. Some authors combine the micro and the macro
models. In Evjen et al. (2005) the micro models are used to estimate the in-
dividual firms’ probability of default that is based on the actual balance–sheet
data (operating income, interest expenses, long–term debt etc.) and the com-
pany size or the industry characteristics. The proxies for the debt–servicing
capacity of the corporate sector are used to estimate the banks’ loan losses.
The overall model then estimates the impact of the demand and the supply
shock in the banking system.
3.4.2 Value–at–risk Models
The VaR macro models represent the extension of the VaR models adopted
in the financial institutions. The models are based on the estimation of the
conditional probability distribution of losses for the different stress scenarios.
The value at risk then, as the summary statistic of this distribution, measures
the sensitivity of the portfolio to the different risks. The macro VaR models
can be set as follows:
V aRi,t
(
Y˜i,t+1/X˜t+1 ≥ X¯
)
= f(Ei,t(Xt);Pt(Xt);PDt(Xt);LGDt(Xt); Σt(Xt))
(3.3)
Xt = h (Xt−1, ..., Xt−p) + t (3.4)
where the portfolio of the aggregate banking system is given by the vec-
tor of the credit and the market risk exposures E , the vector of the prices
P , the default probabilities PD, the loss given default LGD and the matrix
of the default volatilities and the correlations Σ. Furthermore, X is the vec-
tor of the macroeconomic variables which evolve over time, shown in Equa-
tion 3.4. The function f(.) maps the overall vulnerability of the system into
the probability distribution of losses conditional on the macro scenario denoted
as Ω
(
Y˜i,t+1/X˜t+1 ≥ X¯
)
.
The VaR approach allows for the non–linear relationships between the
macro variables and the indicators of the financial stability. Also, it allows
for the integration of the credit and the market risk into one model. The short-
coming of the VaR models is the non–additivity across the portfolios when
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the models are applied to the individual banks.9 Thus, for the analysis of the
banking system, the aggregated portfolio is usually used. However, running the
model on the aggregate portfolio might neglect the contagion effect that could
occur among the institutions.
For the VaR models, Sorge & Virolainen (2006) highlight two approaches
that explicitly link the default probabilities to the macro variables. Wilson
(1997a,b) approach allows to model directly the sensitivity of the default prob-
abilities to the evolution of the set of the macro variables. Merton (1974)
approach firstly models the response of the equity prices to the macro variables
and then translates the asset price changes into the probabilities of default.
Merton (1974) approach Merton’s model was originally developed for the
firm ‘s level. After him, the approach was extended for the purposes of the
macro stress–testing. Merton’s models are frequently set as follows: Firstly,
we make some assumptions about the joint evolution of the macro and the
market factors. These factors are then linked to the corporate return on eq-
uity through the multi–factor regression on the panel of firms. Finally, the
equity returns enter the model to estimate the individual firms’ probabilities
of default. Merton–type model for the Czech economy was used in Jakub´ık
(2007). Jakub´ık & Schmieder (2008) apply the model on the household and
the corporate sectors for the Czech Republic and Germany. Hamerle, Liebig
& Scheule (2004) use factor–model to forecast the default probabilities of the
individual borrowers in Germany. Merton’s model was used also in Drehmann
(2005) for the stress testing the corporate exposures of the banks in the UK.
Wilson (1997) approach Wilson’s approach consists of modelling the rela-
tionship between the default rate and the macro variables. Accordingly, we
generate the shocks and simulate the evolution of the default rates, which are
at the end applied to the particular credit portfolio. Wilson’s approach is intu-
itive and not computationally demanding as the Merton–type models. Wilson’s
logistic model was used in studies of Boss (2002) and Virolainen (2004). Boss
(2002) and Boss et al. (2006) estimate the relationship between the macroeco-
nomic variables and the credit risk for the corporate default rate in the Aus-
trian banking sector. Virolainen (2004) and Virolainen, Jokivuolle & Va¨ha¨maa
9The VaR of the banks’ consolidated portfolio does not equal to the sum of the individual
banks’ VaRs due to the correlations among them.
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(2008) develop the macroeconomic credit risk model that estimates the proba-
bility of default in the various Finish industries.
Integrated market and credit risk analysis Changes in the macroeconomic
fundamentals can influence the market value of banks’ assets and liabilities
directly but also indirectly. Indirectly, they affect the indebtedness ratios of
the households and the firms, which change the credit risk exposures of the
banks. Sorge & Virolainen (2006, p. 127) argue that the incorporation of the
macro variables in the credit risk models implicate that these models analyse
both the market and the credit risks. Wilson’s and Merton’s models implicitly
incorporate the credit and the market risks. There are studies which try to
reflect the two risks more explicitly, for example Barnhill, Papapanagiotou &
Schumacher (2000). Their findings indicate that the market risk, the credit
risk, the portfolio concentration, and the asset and liability mismatches are
all important but not additive sources of risk. Accordingly, they should be
evaluated as a set of the correlated risks.
3.5 Limitations and Challenges
The stress testing, as the relatively new technique, faces many limitations and
challenges. The main shortcomings of the macro stress tests are the frequent
data limitations, the inability of models to capture the correlation of risks and
the risk measures over time and across institutions and to interpret the results in
longer time horizon. Next, the endogenous behaviour of the market agents and
the macro feedbacks, the forecasting limitations of the reduced–form models
and the computational problems of the structural models. Last but not least,
the incorporation of the model’s implications in the policy decision–making is
only partial. The complex discussion of the limitations and the challenges of
the current stress tests can be found in Sorge & Virolainen (2006), Cˇiha´k (2007)
or Drehmann (2008).
3.5.1 Data Availability and Time Horizon
The data that are essential for the stress testing are limited in several ways.
First of all, the severe historical shocks are rare. The historical data are of lim-
ited use. Frequently, the adjustment of the model by the additional assumptions
that are set by the expert judgment or based on the data–generating process
3. Theoretical Background 23
is needed. Secondly, the financial markets develop rapidly and it is difficult to
track all the changes. The financial institutions’ data are often not available (at
least for public use). Some of them (i.e. data on the individual clients) can be
confidential. Even the provided data need not to be exact or comparable with
the data from the other institutions. The model can break down during the
shock as some characteristics, observed in the past, can change (i.e. the borrow-
ers’ repayment discipline). The data limitations should be taken into account
when setting–up and running the models. The use of the standard parametric
econometric models with the insufficient data leads to the non–robust estimates
and the large errors, which in turn reduce the forecasting ability of the model.
Regarding the time horizon, there exist the trade–off between the predictive
power of the model and the ability of the shock to fully translates into the
deterioration of the banks’ financial performance. The crisis usually evolves
over the time and it takes even a few years to show its whole impact. But when
considering longer time horizon, the problems with the endogenous responses
of the system emerge. It is not unlikely, that bank would take the steps to
decrease losses if they once recognise the crisis, even though if its impact did
not fully emerge.
3.5.2 Endogeneity of Risk
Drehmann (2008) provides the three reasons why the endogeneity of the risk
emerges in the stress testing. It happens because of (1) the endogenous be-
haviour of the market agents, (2) the liquidity risk, and (3) the macro feedbacks.
The endogeneity of risk causes that the impact of the exogenous shocks can be
disproportional. The endogenous behaviour of the agents shows that they are
not passive when the shock occurs. For example the banks can fight against
the losses that arise from the crisis by hedging or realigning the portfolio when
some assets or liabilities mature. The liquidity risk (defined in Table 3.1) may
emerge as the response of the endogenous behaviour in the market (i.e. the run
on the weakly performing banks in the case of panic on the market).
Macro feedbacks reflect the linkages between the real economy and the
financial sector. In the stress test we assume the impact of the macroeconomy
on the financial system (often called as the first round effect). The second
round effect is the impact of the stressed financial sector on the macroeconomy.
The difficulties with the macro feedbacks arise from their complexity due to
the heterogeneous market agents that respond differently on the stimulations.
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Frequently, the second round effect is expressed as the injection needed to bring
the particular banks to the regulatory minimum requirements (i.e. CAR). The
injection needed does not cover all feedback effects but it is the useful tool how
to assess the potential fiscal costs of the distress.
Chapter 4
Macroeconomic Credit Risk Model
4.1 Theoretical Framework
The credit risk model developed in this study is based on the approach originally
introduced by Wilson (1997a,b). Wilson’s model is one of the few models that
explicitly links the default rate with the macroeconomic variables and it is based
on the relatively simple logistic function that is used in the regression analysis.
It was empirically shown that the non–linear logistic function is more suitable
for analysing the relationships in the model than the linear functions. Wilson’s
model was further used in the Boss (2002) or Virolainen (2004). Also Cˇiha´k
(2007) suggests the logistic model for estimating the inputs to the stress–testing
modelling. We will discuss the model briefly, however, for the more detailed
discussion, we refer to Wilson (1997a,b).
The idea of the macro credit risk model is as follows: We assess the credit
risk, which is expressed by the default rate, in dependence on the macroe-
conomic variables.1 We simulate the future default losses according to the
changing macroeconomic situations. We test the macroeconomic variables for
the possible correlations in order to reveal existing interdependences. The out-
come of the model is used as the basis for the macro stress testing in Chapter 5.
The default rate or the default probability, defined as the portion of “bad”
loans to total loans in the banking system, is in our model shown as the ratio
of non–performing loans (NPLs) to total loans (NPL ratio). The default rate
is regressed against various macroeconomic variables in order to estimate their
impact on the aggregate banking sector portfolio. We run the model for the
1We assume that more than one variable affects the dependent variable, thus we can call
the model as the multi–factor model.
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household and the corporate sectors separately in order to detect the specific
factors that influence the credit risk in these two sectors.2 We do not consider
the lending to the government sector, since it is commonly considered that this
type of lending does not carry any default risk.
Our model estimates the sector–specific default rate using the logistic func-
tion of the sector–specific index, which depends on the values of the macroeco-
nomic variables:
npls,t =
1
1 + e−ys,t
(4.1)
which can be re–written as:
ln
(
npls,t
1− npls,t
)
= ys,t (4.2)
where npls,t denotes the NPL ratio (default rate) of the sector s and ys,t the
sector–specific index of the sector s at time t. Contrary to Virolainen (2004),
but in line with Boss (2002), we adopt the formulation of the sector–specific
index in such a way that the lower value of ys,t implies the better state of the
economy with lower default rate npls,t.
3
The index ys,t represents the overall state of the economy, and it is the linear
function of the exogenous macroeconomic factors:
ys,t = αs + βsxs,t + s,t (4.3)
where αs is the intercept, βs = (βs,1, βs,2, ..., βs,n) is the set of the regression
coefficients related to the set of sector s–specific macro explanatory variables
xs,t = (xs,1,t, xs,2,t, ..., xs,n,t), and s,t is the random error, which is assumed to
be independent and identically distributed s,t ∼ N(0, σ2 ).4
2The separation of the credit risk modelling for the household and the corporate sector
was used i.e. in Jakub´ık Schmieder (2008). Some authors run the model on the individual
industrial sectors, see Virolainen (2004).
3The formulation leads to the negative coefficients for the variables to which the NPLs
ratio is inversely proportional (i.e. GDP growth) and the positive coefficients for the variables
to which the NPLs ratio is directly proportional (i.e. interest rate).
4Some authors further model the development of the time series of the individual macroe-
conomic factors as the set of the univariate autoregressive equations of the second order AR
(2):
xj,t = cj,0 + cj,1xj,t−1 + cj,2xj,t−2 + νj,t
where cj = (cj,0, cj,1, cj,2 is the set of the regression coefficients related to the j–th macroe-
conomic factor, and νj,t is the random error assumed to be independent and identically dis-
tributed νj,t ∼ N(0, σ2ν) (see Boss 2002 or Virolainen 2004). The purpose of the model is
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The model described above is suitable for the stress testing as it respects the
empirically demonstrated fact that the probability of default is higher in the
“bad”times and lower in the “good”times. Moreover, it separates the corporate
and the household sectors, which usually react to the macroeconomic shocks
in the different ways.
4.2 Data
Our credit risk model is based on the quarterly data. The dependent variable in
the model is the ratio of banking sector’s non–performing loans (NPLs) to total
loans (default rate) with respect to the sector to which it refers (either corporate
sector or households).5 The explanatory variable is the sector–specific index,
composed of the various macroeconomic variables. The macroeconomic data
are the quarterly data, defined as the percentage change in the actual value
compared to the corresponding period of the previous year, thus derived on the
year–to–year basis.6 The time series that were used were generally reported in
the National Banks’ or Statistical Offices’ databases and publications.
4.2.1 Croatia
The quarterly macro data for Croatia are based on the rate of growth in the
given quarter relative to the corresponding quarter of the previous year. They
were obtained from Croatian National Bank (CNB)7, National Statistical Of-
fice8 and Eurostat9. Namely, for the corporate sector the macro factors include:
1) the real GDP growth rate in Croatia and in the EU 1510, 2) the growth rate
of the nominal and the real effective exchange rates, 3) the growth rate of
to estimate the macro variables’s future values, which are applied to the credit risk model.
We do not consider the macro variables’s modelling as we obtain the projected values from
the economic forecasts (i.e. Consensus Forecast) in the case of the baseline scenario, and
from the historical volatility analysis for the adverse scenario. Moreover, we did not find the
macroeconomic factors that are considered in our model to follow the AR (2) process.
5It would be more convenient to use as the dependent variable the first difference of the
NPLs. However, given the logistic form of the credit risk model, such variable would show
the negative values, which are not allowed for the logistic function.
6Note that data that are not derived on the annual basis should be seasonally adjusted
before the analysis starts.
7Available at: http://www.hnb.hr
8Available at: http://www.dzs.hr
9Available at: http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu
10The EU 15 is composed of: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany,
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and United King-
dom. We prefer to use this composition of the EU in order to avoid changes in the time
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the nominal HRK/USD and HRK/EUR exchange rates, 4) the growth rate of
the nominal and the real short–term and long–term lending interest rates for
the corporate loans, 5) the inflation measured by the Consumer Price Index
(CPI)11, and 6) the growth rate of the interest rate spread12.
For the household sector in Croatia we consider the following macro de-
terminants: 1) the real domestic GDP growth rate, 2) the growth rate of the
nominal and the real effective exchange rates, 3) the growth rate of the nominal
HRK/USD and HRK/EUR exchange rates, 4) the growth rate of the nominal
and the real short–term and long–term lending interest rates for the household
loans, 5) the inflation measured by the CPI, 6) the growth rate of the unem-
ployment rate 13, 7) the real wage growth rate, and 8) the disposable income
growth rate. The credit risk model for the corporate and the household sector
in Croatia has been estimated using the observations from Q1 2000 to Q2 2010
(42 observation sample).
The dependent variable in the Croatian credit risk model is the quarterly
default rate measured by the ratio of NPLs to total loans in the particular
sector (firms or households). The data on the NPLs has been available only
on the aggregate basis, apart from the annual rates in the period 2006–2010.
These observations were split into the total, the corporate and the household
NPLs. We calculated the average ratio of sectoral NPLs to total NPLs and we
applied the derived coefficients on the NPLs from the rest of the sample period
in order to generate the time series of both the corporate and the household
NPLs from Q1 2000 to Q2 2010. Then, we calculated the sectoral NPL ratios
by comparing the sectoral NPLs to the corresponding sector’s total loans.
Figure 4.1 shows the development of the total and the sectoral default rates
over the sample period. The NPL ratio (default rate) reaches the relatively
elevated values of around 18% during the years 2000 and 2001. According
to our estimations, in the same period the households show the higher rates
series due to the enlargements of the EU. The real GDP growth rate of the EU is considered
due to the large foreign trade between Croatia and the EU.
11Accordingly, the CPI was employed in the calculations of the real values of the particular
macroeconomic variables such as the effective exchange rate or the interest rates.
12The interest rate spread is defined as the difference between the interest rates on total
loans and on total deposits.
13The calculation of the unemployment rate is based on the definition of the unemployment
rate provided by the International Labour Organization (ILO) (the unemployment rate is the
number of unemployed persons as the percentage of the labour force, see http://www.ilo.org).
For the period 1999–2001 only the annual unemployment rate was available. Assuming the
equally distributed inflow of the labour force and the unemployed over the year, we linearly
interpolated the annual data in order to obtain the quarterly growths.
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Figure 4.1: Total NPL ratio and estimated NPL ratios for the corpo-
rate and the household sectors in Croatia.
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Source: Author’s computations. Variables npl, npl corp and npl hh represent total NPL
ratio, corporate NPL ratio and household NPL ratio, respectively.
than the companies. This differs from the commonly observed pattern. The
demonstrated values suggest that at the beginning of the 21st century, even
though the corporate loans accounted for the major part of the total loans, the
repayment discipline of the Croatian households might have been lower than
that of the companies. In the following year, however, the trend has changed
and the corporate default rate outranked the household rate. Accordingly, the
default rates began to descend and they reached their minimum in the year 2008
(the default rates of 6.8% for the corporations and 3.4% for the households).
The trend has changed when the financial crisis emerged in the late 2008. All
rates jumped up, and their increasing tendency is noticeable until the end of
the sample period with 2010 values of 14% and 8% for the corporations and
the households, respectively.
4.2.2 Serbia
In the case of Serbia, we used the National Bank of Serbia’s (NBS’s) on–line
database to generate the macroeconomic data, except for the GDP growth rate
in the EU 15.14 In line with the existing literature, we consider the following
14Available at: http://www.nbs.rs
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variables for the corporate sector: 1) the real GDP growth rate in Serbia and
in the EU 15 as it is the Serbian main trading partner15, 2) the Industrial
Producer Prices (PPI) growth rate as the indicator of inflation16, 3) the real
industrial production growth rate, 4) the growth rate of the nominal RSD/USD
and RSD/EUR exchange rates, 5) the growth rate of the nominal and the real
effective exchange rates17, and 6) the growth rate of the nominal and the real
lending interest rates. All rates were obtained on the basis of the quarter to
the corresponding quarter of the previous year.
For the household sector model, we use these indicators: 1) the real GDP
growth rate in Serbia, 2) the growth rate of the PPI, 3) the growth rate of
the unemployment rate18, 4) the growth rate of the nominal RSD/USD and
RSD/EUR exchange rates, 5) the growth rate of the nominal and the real
effective exchange rates, and 6) the growth rate of the nominal and the real
lending interest rates19. Due to the restrictions in the NPLs’ time series, the
model for both the corporate and the household sectors has been estimated for
the period Q3 2004–Q3 2010.
In the case of Serbia, some modifications of the dependent variable were
done in order to obtain the sufficiently long time series to run the model. The
quarterly values of the NPLs were available for the period from 2008 Q3 to
2010 Q3 (9 observations). In order to extend the time series, we analysed the
relationship between the NPLs and the classified assets in categories C+D+E
(CDEs), as we assumed the former to be the subcategory of the latter20. After
15According to the reported data of the NBS’s, during the period 1997–2010 the 56.9% of
goods were imported from the EU and 54.2% of goods were exported to the EU, on average.
16It is more convenient to use the CPI as the measure of the inflation. Due to the lack of
data on the CPI for the periods before 2007 we utilise the PPI. Moreover, where practicable,
the PPI was used to derive the real values of the other macro indicators.
17Annual data on the exchange rates for the years 2003 and 2004 were only available.
We multiplied these numbers with the coefficients indicating the relationships between the
exchange rates in the available periods and we obtained the estimations for 2003–2004.
18For the years 2003 and 2004 the number of unemployed was available only on the annual
basis. Therefore, we investigated the change in the number of unemployed during the year
on the available data and we applied gained coefficients on the data from the years 2003 and
2004. For the calculation of the unemployment rate the number of unemployed was divided
by the number of active population over 15 years, which has been available in the Serbian
Statistical Office database (Available at: http://webrzs.stat.gov.rs). The number of active
population was available only on the annual basis, hence we assumed it to be constant during
the particular year in order to arrive at the unemployment rate.
19It is possible to distinguish the lending interest rates for the households and the cor-
porations and to apply the particular rate to the corresponding debtor. Due to the lack of
sufficiently long time series on the separate lending rates we do not consider this approach
in the case of Serbia.
20NBS’s definitions of these variables indicate that by subtracting the category C from
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the adjustment of the CDEs for the structural break, which was caused by the
methodological change in the classifying items and provisions in 2006, and after
multiplying the CDEs with the coefficient derived from the observed relation-
ship between the CDEs and the NPLs, we arrived at the estimated NPLs for
the period 2004 Q3–2008 Q2. The analysis added another 16 observations to
our data set, which now contains 25 observations for the Serbian corporate and
household credit risk models.
Next, we divided the total quarterly NPLs into the corporate and the house-
hold NPLs. The NBS has been reported the sectoral NPLs since the third
quarter of 2008. For the previous periods, the division has been done based on
the coefficients derived from the relationship between the total NPLs and the
sectoral NPLs in the sample period. Finally, we divided the sectoral NPLs by
the corresponding total loans, and we obtained the household and the corporate
NPL ratios. Figure 4.2 shows the development of the total and the sectoral
NPL ratios over time. The NPL ratio, which represents the default rate, re-
mains almost stable during the period from 2004 to mid–2007, demonstrating
the slightly increasing tendency for the corporate loans and the little decreasing
trend for the household loans. From mid–2007 all indicators increase, especially
noticeable is the sharp increase in the corporate default rate from mid–2008 to
mid–2009. The corresponding period reflects the appearance of crisis in Serbia.
In the comparable period, the Serbian default rates demonstrate the similar
path as those of Croatia. Low values of the default rate at the middle of decade
are replaced by the increase after the 2008 turmoil. The Serbian default rates
are characterised by higher volatility, as well as higher absolute values than
those of Croatia (see Figure 4.2). In the case of Croatia, all rates (total, corpo-
rate sector and household sector) show more or less the similar trends, mainly
at the end of the period. On the other hand, the Serbian rates differ, particu-
larly the household default rate during the whole sample period. Relatively low
default rates for the households compared to those of the corporations in the
case of Serbia could be caused by the lower demand for the household lending
or the higher requirements for the credit granting. Thus, the debtors might be
of higher repayment discipline.21 However, relative to the household default
rates in the other countries, the Serbian ones are elevated. The higher repay-
ment discipline of the households is demonstrated also in Croatia. The share
the CDEs we can arrive at the NPLs values. For the exact definitions of the NPLs and the
categories of the classified assets we refer to NBS (2011).
21The household loans represent 28.5% of all loans on average, whereas the corporate loans
account for 62.5% of the loans in the period 2004–2010.
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Figure 4.2: Total NPL ratio and estimated NPL ratios for the corpo-
rate and the household sectors in Serbia.
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Source: Author’s computations. Variables npl, npl corp and npl hh represent total NPL
ratio, corporate NPL ratio and household NPL ratio, respectively.
of the household loans and the corporate loans to the total loans is almost the
same (slightly below 50% for the recent years). Yet, teh households’ rates are
by 3% lower than those of corporations, on average (the default rates of 8%
and 11% for the households and the corporations, respectively).22
4.3 Credit Risk Model for the Corporate Sector
In the whole study we use the econometric software Gretl 1.9.1csv. The macroe-
conomic indicators for Croatia and Serbia were chosen based on the existing
literature, the data availability, the availability of data projections and the
expert judgement, with the aim to consider the data that would explain the
default rates in the meaningful fashion. We consider also the time lags of the
variables in order to describe the model realistically. The matrix of the cor-
relation coefficients for each country has been derived to identify the possible
correlations between the explanatory variables. We presumed that there could
be the correlations primarily between the variables concerning the interest rates
22Note that the provided default rates can slightly differ from the actual ones, especially
at the beginning of the period. The difference can be caused by the modifications that were
carried out in order to obtain longer time series.
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and the exchange rates, which have been proved. The significant correlation
between the industrial production growth rate and the GDP growth rate in
Serbia and between the GDP growth rate in the EU 15 and the growth rates
of the industrial production and the nominal and the real effective exchange
rates appeared (see Table B.1 in Appendix B). In the case of Croatia we found
the correlation between the Croatian GDP growth rate and the EU 15’s GDP
growth rate, the rate of growth of the unemployment rate, the real interest rate
growth rate (total and household lending) and the disposable income growth
rate (see Table B.2 and B.3 in Appendix B). We aimed not to include the
correlated variables together in the model.23
Next, all variables were tested for stationarity. Despite of the relatively
short time series the results of the tests suggest that we should not deny the
stationarity of the variables.24 The regression analysis was performed using
the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) method that was applied to the default rate
(NPL ratio) expressed in the logistic form.25 We started with the univariate
regression analysis to select the significant explanatory variables and their lags,
then we applied the step–wise regression to detect the model that explains the
corporate’default rate most properly. Following Jakub´ık & Schmieder (2008)
and being aware of the relatively short sample period that is used we included
as few explanatory variables as possible in the final model. Accordingly, we
control the model for the possible structural breaks using the QLR test and
the additional Chow’s and CUSUM tests. The following subsections present
the specific credit risk models for Croatia and Serbia.
4.3.1 Croatia
The macroeconomic credit risk model that appeared to explain the default rate
movements of the Croatian corporate sector in the best possible way looks as
follows:
23The correlation coefficient was above 0.5 in the absolute values also for (1) the GDP
growth rates in the EU 15 and Serbia, (2) the GDP growth rate and the rate of growth of
the unemployment rate and the real interest rate in Croatia, and (3) the growth rates of the
unemployment rate and the HRK/USD exchange rate in Croatia. Nevertheless, the small
break of the bounds, which were set by the expert judgement in the interval [-0.5,0.5], and
the relative importance of the variables encouraged us to use them together in the model.
Alternatively, we test all models for collinearity, which was not proved in none of them.
24The KPSS test’s null hypothesis that the variables are stationary was not denied.
25For the control of assumptions of the OLS method, see Table B.4 in Appendix B.
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ln
(
nplcorp,t
1− nplcorp,t
)
= α + β1g hrt−4 + β2rt−4 + β3pit−3
+β4er usdt−2 + β5dum1t + β6dum2t
(4.4)
where nplcorp,t is the default rate defined as the portion of the corporate
NPLs to the total corporate loans in time t, g hr denotes the GDP growth
rate in Croatia, r is the growth rate of the real interest rate, pi is the inflation
measured by the CPI, er usd stands for the growth rate of the HRK/USD ex-
change rate and dum1 and dum2 are dummy variables that adjust the model
for the structural breaks, which have been detected and proved by QLR and
Chow’s tests. The value of dum1 is 1 for period until the fourth quarter of
2004 and 0 afterwards. Accordingly, the value of dum2 is 1 until Q3 2005
and 0 afterwards (see Figure B.1 in Appendix B). The time lags are also indi-
cated. The structural breaks could be caused by the mergers of three big banks
with three medium–size banks in 2004.26. Next, on January 1, 2004 the new
regulations that introduced the new balance–sheet items (i.e. derivative finan-
cial assets and liabilities and other financial liabilities held for trading) came
into force as a part of the harmonisation process with the EU directives27, the
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision’s (BCBS’s) and the International Ac-
counting Standards’ (IAS’) regulations. In 2005, two new banking groups were
established as a result of the changes in the ownership structure of the banks
operating in Croatia. Also, during 2005, the CNB was constantly growing the
allocated reserve and the marginal reserve requirements.28
The results from the regression are summarised in Table 4.1.29 According
to our results, the most significant variables that explain the corporate sector
default rate in Croatia are the real domestic GDP growth rate, the growth
rate of the real interest rate, the inflation and the growth rate of the nominal
26Mergers: Privredna banka Zagreb with Riadria banka, Zagrebacˇka banka with
Varazˇdinska banka, and Nova banka with Dubrovacˇka banka. Moreover, Croatian National
Bank (CNB) did not revoke bank license for Primus banka d.d., which, therefore, started the
closing procedure (CNB 2005a).
27Stabilisation and Association Agreement with the EU came into force in February 2005.
28The marginal reserve requirement rate increased by 16%, the kuna reserve requirement
rate by 10% and the portion of foreign currency reserve requirement allocated in kuna by
8% in the first half of 2005 (see CNB 2005b, p. 22).
29All values refer to the dependent variable defined in the logistic form which, however,
does not change the rule of proportion. In order to derive at the original default rate, we
need to calculate Equation 4.4 using the regression coefficients, with respect to nplcorp,t. The
same rule is valid for all regressions in this chapter.
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Table 4.1: Corporate sector credit risk model for Croatia.
Variable Lag Coeff. value Std. error P–value
constant(α) 0 -2.4229 0.0516796 2.38e-030
g hr(β1) -4 -3.6435 0.688311 9.26e-06
r(β2) -4 0.0779 0.0241417 0.0030
pi(β3) -3 3.5724 1.04595 0.0018
er usd(β4) -2 1.0648 0.155056 1.07e-07
dum1(β5) 0 0.2440 0.0504319 3.41e-05
dum2(β6) 0 0.3347 0.0515974 3.09e-07
R–squared: 0.944061 Adjusted R–squared: 0.933234
Rho: 0.043723 Durbin–Watson: 1.850616
Source: Author’s computations.
exchange rate of Croatian kuna (HRK) against US dollar (USD). All variables
are significant at the 1 % significance level. There was a noticeable improvement
in the performance of the model when we added dummy variables.30
Apart from the real domestic GDP growth rate all coefficients of the ex-
planatory variables have positive signs that indicate that the higher the value
of the variable the higher the default rate. Empirically, the increasing GDP
affects positively demand for goods that companies’ produce, which in turn in-
creases their profits and creditworthiness. Positive impact of the GDP growth
on the debt repayment was confirmed by our model. The four–quarter lag in-
dicates a delay in the corporations’ response to the changes in the economic
conditions, which could be caused by, for example, fixed contracts with their
business partners. The positive impact of the increasing interest rate on the
default rate is also intuitive, as higher interest rates increase the firms’ costs of
loans, and that can cause problems in the loans’ repayment.
The coefficients for the inflation and the growth rate of the HRK/USD ex-
change rate have the positive signs. The positive effect of the inflation and the
depreciation of domestic currency on the default rate can be in contrast with
prevailing expectations. As an explanation we should note that the inflation
can induce the default rate to grow if the increasing price level forces compa-
nies to spend more money on other commodities because they become more
expensive. Thus, the corporations have less resource to repay the debt, even
though the debt becomes cheaper. Also, Baboucˇek & Jancˇar (2005) in their
simulations of the quality of the aggregate loan portfolio in the response to the
30The case of all models in this chapter.
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macro shocks reject the hypothesis that the inflation helps to improve debtors’
creditworthiness. The impact of the depreciation of domestic currency on the
default rate depends on the position of exporters and importers in the economy.
The positive impact of the depreciation on the default rate can suggest that
there are more importers in the economy, for whom the depreciation increases
the cost of goods that are imported and thus causes the problems with the
debt repayment. In fact, the Croatian trade balance has been negative for the
whole period 1999–2009.31
Figure 4.3: Actual and estimated corporate sector default rate for
Croatia.
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Source: Author’s computations.
The performance of the estimated model is shown in Figure 4.3.32 The
default rate is measured by the NPL ratio. At the beginning of the period
there was the relatively high level of the default rate, exceeding 18% in the
mid–2000. However, the default rate was then rapidly falling until 2007, when
it reached the level of 7%. The international financial crisis negatively affected
31The negative trade balance means that the volume of imports exceeds the volume of
exports. Considering the trade with all countries in the world and in all products, the
Croatian trade balance in period 1999–2009 was -6 930 million EUR on average (Source:
Eurostat database, available at: http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu).
32Note that the plotted values in Figure 4.3 are the original default rate values that were
derived back from the logistic form used in the regression analysis. The descriptive statistics
of the model belongs to the dependent variable in the logistic form. Unless stated otherwise,
all figures in this chapter refer to the original default rates, whereas the models’ statistics
are based on the dependent variable in the logistic form.
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Croatia in 2008. The corporate sector has responded by the steep increase in
the corporate default rate. In Q2 2010, the default rate was more than 14%.
The estimated model follows the actual values relatively well, especially at the
end of period, where it demonstrates lower volatility than at the beginning of
the period.
Table 4.2: Descriptive statistics of the explanatory variables in the
corporate sector credit risk model for Croatia.
Variable Mean Std. deviation Min Max
g hr 0.028816 0.03699 -0.069 0.068
r 0.2362 0.90721 -0.76004 4.3877
pi 0.028474 0.01606 0.007 0.076
er usd -0.039901 0.094945 -0.17118 0.23208
Source: Author’s computations.
The descriptive statistics for the explanatory variables is provided in Ta-
ble 4.2 (time period Q1 2001–Q2 2010). The mean values of the domestic GDP,
the real interest rate and the inflation indicate the growing tendency on aver-
age, although, apart from the inflation all of them experienced also periods of
decrease. The mean value of the exchange rate of HRK against USD points out
the appreciation on average. The highest volatility can be found in the growth
rate of the interest rates, with the standard deviation of more than 90%.
4.3.2 Serbia
The estimated macroeconomic credit risk model for the Serbian corporate sec-
tor is as follows:
ln
(
nplcorp,t
1− nplcorp,t
)
= α + β1g srbt−4 + β2g eut + β3er eurt−1 + β4dumt (4.5)
where nplcorp,t is the default rate defined as the portion of the corporate’s
non–performing loans to total corporate’s loans in time t, g srb denotes the
GDP growth rate in Serbia, g eu is the GDP growth rate in the EU 15, er eur
stands for the growth rate of the RSD/EUR exchange rate and dum represents
the dummy variable, which adjust the model for the structural break that have
been detected and proved by QLR and Chow’s tests (see Figure B.2 in Ap-
pendix B). The dummy has the value 1 for the period until the fourth quarter
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of 2008 and the value 0 afterwards. The time lags are also indicated. The struc-
tural break at the end of 2008 can be caused by the large accounting changes
that came into force on July 1, 2008, especially the changes in computing and
recording receivables, liabilities and lending activities.33 Moreover, the year
2008 was in sign of the rapid growth in lending activity that was dominated
by the credits to corporations. The corporate lending rose by 45% over the
year whereas the household lending increased by 20%. A 20 % increase in the
household lending in 2008 is in contrast with the end of 2007 when its increased
by 54% relative to the end of 2006.
Table 4.3: Corporate sector credit risk model for Serbia.
Variable Lag Coeff. value Std. error P–value
constant(α) 0 -1.2588 0.0464869 3.11e-017
g srb(β1) -4 -1.2061 0.561145 0.0440
g eu(β2) 0 -6.0872 1.59602 0.0011
er eur(β3) -1 -1.0998 0.241101 0.0002
dum(β4) 0 -0.6843 0.0587632 2.31e-010
R–squared: 0.95049 Adjusted R–squared: 0.940587
Rho: 0.004727 Durbin–Watson: 1.916890
Source: Author’s computations.
Table 4.3 summarises the results from the regression analysis of the Serbian
corporate sector. We found that the most significant variables are the real GDP
growth of Serbia and the EU 15 and the growth of the nominal exchange rate
of Serbian dinar (RSD) against euro (EUR). All coefficients of the explanatory
variables have negative signs, the outcome that is in line with the assumptions
of the negative impact of GDP growth and currency depreciation on the default
rate in the small export–oriented country.
The transmission channels between the GDP growth and the default rate
are relatively easy to trail. The increasing GDP stimulates the demand for
goods that corporations produce and that increases their profits and ability to
repay the debt. The probability of default decreases.A similar view is behind
the negative impact of the EU 15’s GDP growth since the major part of the
33Chart of Accounts and Content of Accounts within the Chart of Accounts for Banks,
Guidelines on the Obligation and Methodology of Recording, Compiling, Processing and
Delivery of Data on the Stock and Structure of Lending, Receivables and Liabilities of Banks,
and Rules on the Forms and Content of Items in Financial Statement Forms to be Completed
by Banks (see NBS 2008).
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Serbian foreign trade is exported to the EU. The different time lags of the
two variables and higher coefficient in the absolute values for the EU’s GDP
could be caused by higher sensitivity of exporting firms. It is possible that
exports consist mainly of goods that react cyclically to the changes in economic
conditions (i.e. cars and machinery) and that contracts are fixed on the short
periods.34
The significance of the Serbia’s relations to the EU is further demonstrated
by the third variable, the RSD/EUR exchange rate that was more significant
than exchange rate of dinar against USD, for example. The negative impact of
depreciation of the domestic currency on the default rate is given by the fact
that the currency depreciation favours domestic exporters and increases their
profits, which in turn helps to decrease their default rates.
Figure 4.4: Actual and estimated corporate sector default rate for Ser-
bia.
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The performance of the estimated model is demonstrated in Figure 4.4. In
the first years of the period there was a relatively low level of the default rate
(below 10%) compared to the following period that was characterised by the
steep increase of the default rate in mid–2008 with the two peaks in mid–2009
and 2010.35 The end of the period indicates the default rates to be around
34In fact, the machinery, the apparatus and the transport equipment form the third biggest
group of the Serbian exports in the last three years, according to the NBS’s reports.
35In comparison to the other countries, this value is still very high. Jakub´ık & Schmieder
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20%. The values reflect the relatively high portion of the “bad” loans and can
indicate persistent problems in the banking sector in Serbia. The estimated
model captures the pattern of the actual values more or less properly.
Table 4.4: Descriptive statistics of the explanatory variables in the
corporate sector credit risk model for Serbia.
Variable Mean Std. deviation Min Max
g srb 0.044196 0.041625 -0.044797 0.13677
g eu 0.012993 0.013750 -0.013204 0.029750
er eur 0.067411 0.084821 -0.0811 0.21429
Source: Author’s computations.
Descriptive statistics for the explanatory variables in the Serbian credit risk
model is provided in Table 4.4 (time period from Q1 2004 to Q3 2010). The
mean values of the Serbian and the European GDPs and the exchange rate
of dinar against euro show their growing tendency on average, although all of
them experienced also periods of decrease. The growth rate of the exchange
rate experiences the highest volatility with the standard deviation of almost
8.5%.
When we compare the estimated models for Croatia and Serbia we can
see some similarities, especially the significance of domestic GDP growth rate
and growth rate of exchange rate for both countries. Both Croatia and Serbia
have the managed floating exchange rate regimes. The dependence of the
default rate on the exchange rates points to the small open economies that rely
heavily on the international trade. Serbia seems to be more dependent on the
trade with the EU as GDP of the EU and the exchange rate of dinar against
euro are remaining explanatory variables beside the domestic GDP growth.
Croatian corporate sector default rate reacts more on the exchange rate of
kuna against the leading currency in the international trade–the US dollar.
Remaining explanatory variables are rather domestic– the GDP growth, the
price level and the interest rate. Probably due to the shorter sample period in
the case of Serbia, the estimated Croatian model fits better the real values and
does not experience such volatility as the Serbian one.
In the credit risk model of the Croatian and the Serbian corporate sectors
the macroeconomic factors other than those described above appeared to be
(2008) analysed the corporate sector default rates in the Czech Republic and Germany and
their values in 2006 were around 3% and 1.5%, respectively.
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non–significant or not appropriate in an economic sense, especially in the com-
bination with other factors. We controlled the appropriateness of the model
using all tests required for the OLS method, namely the normality of residuals,
the homoscedasticity, the autocorrelation of residuals and the collinearity of
variables. Moreover, we tested the stability of parameters using the CUSUM
test and the adequateness of the model specification using Ramsey’s RESET
test. None of tests revealed any distresses. The models’ coefficients of determi-
nation are very high, demonstrating the good performance of the models when
explaining the evolution of the default rates. However, given the relatively
small sample period especially in the case of Serbia, R–squared or adjusted R–
squared could be lower if we add more observations. More observations could
even change the output or bring more significant variables. What is more, the
estimated Serbian NPLs from the CDEs for the sample period until mid–2007
and the various NBS’s and CNB’s methodological changes during the observed
period indicate that we should be conservative when interpreting the model.
Thus, we do not see the models as benchmarks that have to be valid in ev-
ery situation. For our purposes and with available data, however, the models
demonstrate the relatively good performance and the predictive power.
4.4 Credit Risk Model for the Household Sector
Similarly to the credit risk model for the corporate sector we verified the basic
assumptions as stationarity and correlation between variables before initiating
regression analysis for the household sector model. The regression was again
performed using the OLS method, applied to the default rate (NPL ratio for the
household sector) in logistic form.36 Firstly, we ran the univariate regression
analysis to detect the significant variables and their lags. In the step–wise
regression the variables interacted and we modified them in order to obtain
meaningful model that fits data in the best possible way. Using the QLR test
we controlled the model for the structural breaks. If a structural break was
found, the dummy variable was added to adjust the model for the structural
break.
36For the control of assumptions of OLS method, see Table B.5 in Appendix B.
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4.4.1 Croatia
The estimated macroeconomic credit risk model for the household sector in
Croatia is as follows:
ln
(
nplhh,t
1− nplhh,t
)
= α + β1g hrt−2 + β2ut−3 + β3pit−5
+β4dum1t + β5dum2t
(4.6)
where nplhh,t is the default rate defined as the portion of households’ non–
performing loans to total households’ loans in time t, g hr denotes the GDP
growth rate in Croatia, u is the growth rate of the unemployment rate, pi stands
for the inflation measured by the CPI and dum1 and dum2 are dummy vari-
ables that adjust the model for the structural breaks, which have been detected
and proved by QLR and Chow’s tests. The value of dum1 is 1 for periods prior
to Q3 2004 and 0 afterwards. The value of dum2 is 1 until Q4 2006 and 0
afterwards (see Figure B.1 in Appendix B). The time lag of every variable is
indicated. The first structural break represented in the model by dum1 has
probably the same grounds as the first structural break in the Croatian cor-
porate sector model. The second structural break is not easy to interpret. It
could be the response to the announced privatisation of the key state–owned
steel, shipbuilding, telecommunication and oil industries, that should have in-
cluded the employee ownership (ESOP–Employee Stock Ownership Plan) as
the important part of the new ownership structure. The new Privatisation
Law, however, never came into force, and what is more, the cancellation of
the old one was announced in 2009.37 Another reason for the structural break
could be the takeover of the two banks in Croatia by the foreign banks in 2006
and also the introduction of the new risk weights (the new 75 % risk weight)
that led to the change in the structure of credit–risk weighted assets.38
Table 4.5 shows the regression results with the macro factors that explain
the development of the default rate for the Croatian households. The domes-
tic GDP growth rate has a negative sign, whereas the growth rates of the
unemployment rate and the inflation have positive signs. The negative effect
of the GDP growth on the default rate results from the fact that similarly
to the corporations also the households benefit from the favourable economic
37BMI (2006), and Tportal.hr (2009).
38CNB (2007).
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Table 4.5: Household sector credit risk model for Croatia.
Variable Lag Coeff. value Std. error P–value
constant(α) 0 -3.0912 0.0661304 2.60e-030
g hr(β1) -2 -1.8276 0.757563 0.022
u(β2) -3 1.7730 0.208148 1.27e-09
pi(β3) -5 3.2625 1.39434 0.0259
dum1(β4) 0 0.5417 0.0488127 2.51e-012
dum2(β5) 0 0.2026 0.0533838 0.0006
R–squared: 0.954021 Adjusted R–squared: 0.946605
Rho: 0.041182 Durbin–Watson: 1.846594
Source: Author’s computations.
conditions. Conversely, the increasing unemployment causes the default rate
to grow as more people lose jobs and their creditworthiness decreases. The
inflation again, as in the case of Croatian companies, increases the default rate
probably because people spend more resources on the other commodities. The
relatively long lags in the case of the inflation and the unemployment suggest
that it takes some time until households react to the changes in these variables
and that they possibly hold some reserves they can use in the case of distress.
Figure 4.5: Actual and estimated household sector default rate for
Croatia.
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Figure 4.5 demonstrates the Croatian household sector default rate for the
period from Q1 1999 to Q2 2010. In the first two years of the period the default
rate reached the values of almost 20%, which were even higher than in the case
of the corporate sector. However, from 2001 the default rate was constantly
decreasing. In 2007 it rested on approximately 4% rate for another two years.
Similarly to the default rate of firms it started to grow in the light of the
financial crisis in 2009 and it followed the increasing path until the end of the
sample period (see Figure 4.5 and Figure 4.3 in Section 4.3.1for comparison).
In Q2 2010 the default rate was around 7.7%. The estimated model catches up
the actual values properly, apart from the periods of higher volatility around
the years 2004 and 2008.
Table 4.6: Descriptive statistics of the explanatory variables in the
household sector credit risk model for Croatia.
Variable Mean Std. deviation Min Max
g hr 0.028816 0.03699 -0.069 0.068
u -0.0315958 0.12523 -0.25688 0.39535
pi 0.028474 0.01606 0.007 0.076
Source: Author’s computations.
Table 4.6 provides the descriptive statistics of the explanatory variables in
the household sector credit risk model (time period from Q1 2001 to Q2 2010).
The domestic GDP and the inflation are the same as in the model of corporate
sector and for their discussion we refer to Section 4.3.1. The mean of the growth
rate of the unemployment rate suggests the decreasing path over the period on
average with, however, relatively high standard deviation of 12%.
4.4.2 Serbia
The final macroeconomic credit risk model for the household sector in Serbia
is as follows:
ln
(
nplhh,t
1− nplhh,t
)
= α + β1er eurt + β2ut + β3it−3 + β4pit−4 + β5dumt (4.7)
where nplhh,t is the default rate defined as the portion of households’ non–
performing loans to total households’ loans in time t, er eur is the RSD/EUR
exchange rate growth, u is the growth of the unemployment rate, i is the
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nominal interest rate growth, pi stands for the inflation and dum denotes the
dummy variable that adjusts model for the structural break that we found to
be in place in mid–2008 (see Figure B.2 in Appendix B), with value of 1 for the
period prior to Q3 2008 and with the value of 0 afterwards.39 The origins of
the structural break in mid–2008 more likely rise from the same reasons as in
the case of the corporate sector model (see Section 4.3). Respective time lags
are presented in the equation.
Table 4.7 sums up the regression results and shows the most significant
macro factors that explain the development of the default rate for the house-
holds. The exchange rate of the Serbian dinar against euro, the growth of the
unemployment rate and the nominal lending interest rate growth have positive
signs, which indicates that they have the positive impact on the default rate.
The negative sign of the inflation suggests the negative impact of this variable
on the default rate.40 All coefficients are significant at 1% level, including the
dummy variable. There was a noticeable improvement in the performance of
the model when we added dummy variable.
Table 4.7: Household sector credit risk model for Serbia.
Variable Lag Coeff. value Std. error P–value
const(α) 0 -2.1873 0.0870917 1.83e-015
er eur(β1) 0 1.1616 0.267025 0.0004
u(β2) 0 1.6337 0.218626 6.38e-07
i(β3) -3 0.5167 0.110369 0.0002
pi(β4) -4 -5.1918 0.740572 1.52e-06
dum(β5) 0 -0.1806 0.0365485 0.0001
R–squared: 0.959439 Adjusted R–squared: 0.948172
Rho: -0.003088 Durbin–Watson: 1.904530
Source: Author’s computations.
Positive impact of the RSD/EUR exchange rate growth on the default rate41
might be the result of the preference for loans denominated in the foreign cur-
39Chow’s test confirmed the presence of the structural break at the end of 2008, when the
null hypothesis of no structural break was rejected at 1% confidence level. The CUSUM test
demonstrated higher parameters’ stability in the presence of dummy variable. Additional
Chow’s tests did not show any other structural breaks.
40The positive impact on default rate means that the growth of variable causes default rate
to increase. The negative impact appears when the growth of variable leads to the decrease
in the default rate.
41That in fact signifies the depreciation of dinar against euro relative to the corresponding
period a year earlier.
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rency (mostly in euro) for a part of the Serbian households.42 Non–hedged
loans are vulnerable to the foreign exchange rate risk, when the depreciation
of domestic currency makes loans to be more expensive and their repayment
more difficult to accomplish. The consequences of the growing unemployment
or the nominal lending interest rates for the household default rate are intu-
itive. The rising unemployment brings about more people unable to meet their
obligations. No time lag between the increase in the unemployment rate and
its effect on the default rate can suggest that the households do not possess
any savings on their disposal, or at least, are not willing to use them for the
debt repayment if people lose the jobs. The increasing interest rates cause the
mark–up of both existing and future loans.43
The negative effect of the inflation on the default rate is demonstrated in
the deterioration of the real value of debt. Nevertheless, the time lag in turning
the effect up more likely signals the prevalence of the negative effect of inflation
on households in form of the decreased purchasing power if we assume the rigid
wages. The households preserve less resource for their credit obligations. When
wages adjust to the new price level, the purchasing power turns to be at the
same level and the positive effect of the inflation from the debtor’s point of
view prevails. To sum it up, all signs are in line with our intuitive expectations
about the direction of impact of the individual explanatory variables.
Other variables such as the real GDP growth rate in Serbia, the nominal
RSD/USD exchange rate growth, the nominal and the real effective exchange
rate growth, and the real lending interest rate growth came up to be insignif-
icant in the model described above. However, they might become significant
if the variables and their lags are chosen differently or if the sample period
is longer. Yet, given the available dataset of both dependent and explanatory
variables, the model described in Table 4.7 shows the best possible performance
in estimating the household sector default rate, with satisfactory results of all
tests required for the OLS estimates, and moreover with the good explana-
tory power that is measured by the coefficients of determinacy. Actual and
estimated values of the default rate are plotted in Figure 4.6. The high lev-
els of the default rate of almost 10% in 2004 and 2005 were replaced by the
sharp decrease until 2007, where the default rate reached its minimum of ap-
proximately 4%. In the next period the economic situation deteriorated. The
42In the period 2003–2009 the ratio of loans to households denominated in the foreign
currency to all household’s loans was 3.57%, on average.
43Assuming that the interest rates on the loans are not fixed until maturity.
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Figure 4.6: Actual and estimated household sector default rate for
Serbia.
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following years were in sign of the economic recession, with the peak in the
household default rate in 2009 that was, however, not higher than the rates
six years earlier. The end of the sample period shows the default rate reach-
ing almost 8%. The estimated model captures this pattern properly, with the
exception in the end of 2009, where it shows the different trend. After all, it
turns to follow the actual pattern at the end of the sample period, so that we
consider its volatility continuously decreases.
Table 4.8: Descriptive statistics of the explanatory variables in the
household sector credit risk model for Serbia.
Variable Mean Std. deviation Min Max
er eur 0.067411 0.084821 -0.0811 0.21429
u -0.018288 0.074369 -0.14650 0.093201
i -0.014288 0.25398 -0.35213 0.62713
pi 0.10448 0.036014 0.0490 0.1620
Source: Author’s computations.
The descriptive statistics of the explanatory variables for the period from
Q1 2004 to Q3 2010 is available in Table 4.8. The variable that is volatile the
most turns out to be the nominal interest rate with the standard deviation of
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25%. Although all variables show positive as well as negative growth rates, the
inflation reaches only positive values which indicate that there were no defla-
tionary periods in the sample. The mean values suggest the unemployment rate
and the nominal interest rate to decrease and the inflation and the exchange
rate of dinar against euro to increase, on average.
Estimated models for the households both in Croatia and Serbia identify
the growth rate of the unemployment rate and the inflation as the significant
variables in explaining the default rates’ movements. In both countries the
unemployment increases household’s probability of default as the working is
traditionally the main source of income. The inflation influences countries’
default rates in opposite ways, having the negative effect on the default rate
in the Serbian model and the positive effect in the Croatian one. It seems
that Serbian households respond to the increase in inflation that causes debt
to be cheaper by improving repayment discipline, even though if it goes in
line with the higher prices of other commodities. On the other hand, the case
of Croatia suggests that if the price level increases, the households shift their
resources from repaying the debt to purchasing commodities that become more
expensive, thus the default rate increases. Nevertheless, both countries react
on the inflation with the relatively long delay. In the remaining explanatory
variables the two countries differ.
Similarly as in the corporate credit risk models, the model of Croatia shows
better performance and lower volatility probably due to more observations used.
Again, we controlled if all assumptions of the OLS model were fulfilled. All
test for the normality of residuals, the homoscedasticity, the autocorrelation of
residuals, the collinearity of variables showed no deviation from the preliminary
assumptions. Moreover, the CUSUM test for the stability of parameters and
Ramsey’s RESET test for the adequateness of the model were performed. Both
models demonstrate the relatively good performance and the predictive power.
Yet, as in the corporate sector model we should be aware of the relatively short
sample period and we should not regard the models as benchmarks. As a part
of the future research it could be appropriate to revise them on the longer time
horizon.
Chapter 5
Macro Stress Testing
5.1 Scenario Analysis
This section develops two scenarios that project the macroeconomic conditions
for Croatia and Serbia that will be used in the stress testing on the individual
bank’s level. The baseline scenario reflects the most likely evolution of the
macroeconomic factors in the one year horizon starting from the end of 2010
and ending in the fourth quarter of 2011. For the stress testing of the individ-
ual banks the macro conditions in Q4 2011 are relevant. The baseline scenario
is formulated in line with the forecasts provided by the international organisa-
tions, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), or the macroeconomic
survey companies as the Consensus Economics (Consensus Forecasts) and the
Business Monitor International (BMI).1 If not available elsewhere, we use the
forecasts of domestic governmental organisations, usually to support or adjust
the forecasts from other sources.2 In the one year horizon some variables even
need not to be projected due to the time lags in the macro credit risk models.
The adverse scenario is set by the expert judgement, using the observed val-
ues of the individual variables in the past. Our shock consists of the movements
in all variables that enter the credit risk model, contrary to some studies that
stimulate only one variable per shock.3 We attempt to determine the shock
consistently, that is to utilise the maximum movements of the variables from
the overlapping periods. This method is so–called historical simulation stress
1Analogous approach was applied in the Federal Reserve System’s (Fed’s) implementation
of the Supervisory Capital Assessment Program (SCAP), see Board of the Governors of the
Federal Reserve System (2009a).
2In case the forecasts are not available, another possibility is to employ simple vector
autoregressive model (VAR).
3The approach was used i.e. in Jakub´ık & Schmieder (2008).
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testing. The adverse scenario is plausible because the considered values have
been already observed. That brings our hypothetical adverse scenario closer
to reality, maybe at the expense of the severity of the shock.4 The scenarios
consider two sources of risk: the credit risk and the market risk (divided into
the interest rate and the exchange rate risks). For each sector the baseline and
the adverse scenarios are the same.
5.1.1 Croatia
In this section we develop the one year horizon baseline and adverse scenarios
for Croatia. For the variables that enter the credit risk model developed in
Chapter 4 we present the projected values according to the scenario. For the
baseline scenario that should reflect the most likely situation at the end of 2011
we employ projections from the BMI Emerging Europe Monitor5, Consensus
Forecasts6 and actual values from the CNB’s database.7
More specifically, the baseline situation might look as follows (Table 5.1):
at the end of 2010 Croatia experiences the negative GDP growth, which affects
the default rate of the corporations at the end of 2011. During 2011 we expect
the positive GDP growth that affects positively the creditworthiness of the
Croatian households at the end of the year. There is a 12 % drop in the real
interest rate in Q4 2010 relative to the same period a year ago. The drop
favours corporate debt repayment. Relatively low inflation of 1.4% in 2010 has
increased to 3.4% in 2011. According to the credit risk model estimated for
the corporate sector in Chapter 4 the higher inflation increases the corporate
default rate. We expect Croatian kuna to appreciate against US dollar by
10.6% in Q2 2011 relative to the corresponding period a year ago that was
in the sign of depreciation. The appreciation affects negatively the corporate
default rate. The unemployment rate continues to rise. The described macro
variables enter the credit risk models of the corporate and household sectors.
4On the contrary, we could line up the observations and take those ones that belong to the
5–10% bottom quantile. Boss (2002) utilises the historically observed maximum movements
of the macro variables in the scenario. In this case, however, the scenario needs not to be
consistent because the variables can demonstrate maximum movements in the quite different
periods. Oppositely, Virolainen (2004) sets shock expertly by increasing or decreasing the
values of the variables by certain percentage points.
5See BMI (2011).
6Consensus Economics (2010a,b)
7Namely, we used data from the Consensus Forecast to project the GDP growth rate and
the inflation and the BMI data for the HRK/USD exchange rate. The unemployment rate
was adopted from the Eurostat database and the real interest rate from the CNB. Some
values were not projected due to their time lag in the model.
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The results of the models are the estimated probabilities of default (default
rates) that will be further used in the computations of the credit risk losses on
the individual bank’s level.
Table 5.1: Explanatory variables that enter the credit risk models for
the actual, the baseline and the adverse scenarios in Croa-
tia.
Corporate sector Time lag Actual (%) Baseline (%) Adverse (%)
g hr -4 -6.9 -0.6 -6.7
r -4 439 -12 18
pi -3 1.0 3.4 6.4
er usd -2 13.3 -10.6 - 4.0
Household sector Time lag Actual (%) Baseline (%) Adverse (%)
g hr -2 -0.05 0.02 -5.7
u -3 26.8 23.9 36.3
pi -5 3.8 1.4 1.4
Source: Author’s computations. The actual scenario refers to Q2 2010, the baseline and the
adverse scenarios to Q4 2011. Variables g hr, er usd, u, r and pi represent the growth rates
of the Croatian GDP, the HRK/USD exchange rate, the unemployment rate, the real interest
rate, and the inflation, respectively. The values are showed with respect to time lag in which
they appear in the model (for example, Croatian GDP growth rate of -6.9% is the value of
Q2 2009 that due to time lag appears in the model that estimates Q2 2010 situation).
The economic conditions regarding the market risk at the end of 2011 are
described in Table 5.2. For the calculation of the bank’s interest rate losses the
CNB’s key interest rate is relevant. The CNB has not changed it since 2008
and it was announced that the rate would not change in the first half of 2011.
We assume that the rate will rest on 9% until the end of 2011 for the baseline
scenario. For the exchange rate losses we use the projected exchange rates of
kuna against the US dollar and the euro from the BMI’s forecasts. These are
7.01 and 5.27 HRK/EUR and HRK/USD, respectively.8 The rates reflect the
appreciation of kuna. The comparison to the situation in Q4 2010 is provided
in the table. The overall baseline scenario suggests that in 2011 Croatia might
experience the economic recovery.
In the adverse scenario we have changed all variables except for the inflation
in the case of the households, due to its time lag. Especially, the growth rates
of GDP and the real interest rate demonstrate highly different paths relative
8Note that conversely to the credit risk, in the case of the market risk there are no time
lags.
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Table 5.2: Variables that enter the market risk’s computation for the
actual, the baseline and the adverse scenarios in Croatia.
Actual Baseline Adverse
i cnb 9% 9% 11%
Change to actual scenario – +0% +2%
er eur 7.39 7.01 7.29
Change to actual scenario – -0.38 -0.10
er usd 5.57 5.27 5.00
Change to actual scenario – -0.30 -0.57
Source: Author’s computations. The actual scenario refers to Q4 2010, the baseline and the
adverse scenarios to Q4 2011. Variables i cnb, er eur and er usd indicate the CNB’s key
interest rate, the HRK/EUR and the HRK/USD exchange rates. The values of the baseline
and the adverse scenarios will serve as inputs in the computations of individual bank’s losses
from the market risk.
to the baseline scenario. The adverse scenario reflects the prolongation of
the crisis from 2008 or, more specifically, its return after the relatively good
conditions in 2010. The influence of 2010 values in the 2011 estimations via
the credit risk models causes that the effect of the shock on the default rates
is noticeable only in the end of 2011. The default rates in the adverse scenario
show the same trend as in the baseline scenario, except for the end–of–year
values. Yet, in the two–year horizon the effect of the shock could be fully
translated into the deterioration of the default rates. Specifically, we assume the
negative domestic GDP growth rate of more than 5% through the whole year,
the situation experienced in 2009. We let the inflation and the unemployment
rate to increase, the situation that was observable in some periods of the recent
crisis in Croatia. We suppose also that the CNB perceived increasing inflation
and that it aims to fight it by elevating its interest rate. The result is the
increase of banks’ interest rates. The intervention does not lower the inflation
until the end of the year, which in our credit risk model would be noticeable
in 2012.
For the market risk calculation the input variables in the adverse scenario
are chosen as follows: Assuming the CNB’s efforts to lower inflation, we in-
crease its base interest rate for 2%. The increase will negatively affect banks’
available–for–sale securities in the balance sheets. It will affect also the interest
income that arises from the maturity gap between interest sensitive assets and
liabilities, however with the uncertain impact. For the exchange rate risk we
assume the two main exchange rates, kuna against euro and kuna against US
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dollar. They are set according to the 2009 values. For the both cases the kuna
appreciates relative to the Q4 2010 values. The impact of the exchange rates
on the banks’ portfolio will depend on the net open foreign exchange (FX)
position of the bank in the particular currency. The credit risk default rates
arisen from the scenarios are depicted in Figures 5.1 and 5.2 in Section 5.2.1.
5.1.2 Serbia
This section describes the set up of the 2011 scenarios for Serbia. For the on
year baseline estimations of the Serbian and the EU 15’s GDP growth rates
and the growth rates of the unemployment rate and the RSD/EUR exchange
rate we employed the projected data from the Consensus Forecasts, the IMF
World Economic Outlook9, the BMI Emerging Europe Monitor and the Centre
for Strategic Economic Studies ”Vojvodina–CESS”.10 Due to time lags of the
inflation and the growth rate of the nominal interest rate in the credit risk
models we did not forecast these variables.
Table 5.3: Explanatory variables that enter the credit risk models for
the actual, the baseline and the adverse scenarios in Serbia.
Corporate sector Time lag Actual (%) Baseline (%) Adverse (%)
g srb -4 -2.19 3.30 -4.29
g eu 0 2.40 1.40 -0.87
er eur -1 11.70 -1.01 - 6.04
Household sector Time lag Actual (%) Baseline (%) Adverse (%)
er eur 0 14.15 -0.38 -1.07
u 0 -0.92 -4.32 4.50
i -3 -34.95 23.27 60.83
pi -4 5.30 16.20 16.20
Source: Author’s computations. The actual scenario refers to Q3 2010, the baseline and
the adverse scenarios to Q4 2011. The variables g srb, g eu, er eur, u, i and pi represent
the growth rates of the Serbian and the EU 15’s GDPs, the RSD/EUR exchange rate, the
unemployment rate, the nominal interest rate, and the inflation, respectively. The values are
showed with respect to time lag in which they appear in the model (for example, the Serbian
GDP growth rate of -2.19% is the value of Q3 2009, which due to time lag appear in the
model that estimates Q3 2010 situation).
9Available at: http://www.imf.org.
10Specifically, Consensus Forecasts were used for GDP growth rates projections, BMI’s
data for RSD/EUR exchange rate, and the average of the IMF’s and Vojvodina–CESS &
IHS (2011) data on the unemployment rate.
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The baseline scenario for the end of 2011 is as follows: at the end of 2011
we expect the EU GDP to grow almost 1.4% relative to the same period a
year before. That favours Serbian exporters. The corporations in Serbia also
benefit from the expected 3.3 % growth of the domestic GDP at the end of
2010.11 On the other hand, the expected slight appreciation of dinar causes
that the exported goods are more expensive and can reduce the companies’
profits. Thus, the overall impact on the corporate default rate depends on
its sensitivity to the changes of the given variables. For the households, the
appreciation can help to reduce the default rate, as part of the households
takes loans denominated in euro. Furthermore, the noticeable drop in the
unemployment rate (by 4.32%) and a 16 % increase in the price level at the
end of 2010 favour the households.12
The NBS has announced the increase of its key interest rate to 12.5% in
order to fight accelerating inflation. This intervention puts the NBS in the
group of central banks with the highest interest rates. Accordingly, the lending
interest rate started to grow at the end of 2010, with 23 % higher values in
Q1 2011 compared to the same period last year. As a result the loans will be
more expensive and their repayment might be complicated (see Table 5.3 and
5.4). Contrary to the dinar appreciation against the euro, we expect the dinar
to depreciate against the US dollar, the projection provided by the forecasters
from the BMI at the end of 2010. The impact of the exchange rate changes on
banks’ portfolios will depend on their net open positions in given currencies.
The adverse scenario assumes the different path of the macro variables that
is in the case of the GDPs, the unemployment rate and the nominal interest rate
markedly different from the actual situation. In the adverse scenario we suppose
the GDP growth of the EU 15 to run the course of the financial crisis (end–2008
value). Also the GDP growth in Serbia experiences the crisis situation from the
beginning of 2009. Both regions demonstrate the negative GDP growth, which
is in the case of Serbia relatively high, with the value of -4.29%, compared to
that of the EU 15 (-0.87%). We suppose the raise in the unemployment, with
the unemployment rate growth rate of 4.5% (Q2 2009 value). The efforts of the
NBS to fight inflation and higher uncertainty during the shock are reflected in
the sharp increase in the lending interest rate (2008 values). The banks are not
willing to provide credits and they require high compensation rate for them.
11The forecast value of the GDP growth for 2011 was placed in the last quarter of 2010
because the actual values of Q4 2010 has not been available.
12Note that the inflation makes loans cheaper from the debtor’s point of view.
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Table 5.4: Variables that enter the market risk’s computation for the
actual, the baseline and the adverse scenarios in Serbia.
Actual Baseline Adverse
i nbs 11.5% 12.5% 13.5%
Change to actual scenario – +1% +2%
er eur 105.5 105.1 104.4
Change to actual scenario – -0.4 -1.1
er usd 79.3 82.4 85.5
Change to actual scenario – -3.1 -6.2
Source: Author’s computations. The actual scenario refers to Q4 2010, the baseline and the
adverse scenarios to Q4 2011. The variables i nbs, er eur and er usd indicate the NBS’s key
interest rate, the RSD/EUR and the RSD/USD exchange rates. The values of the baseline
and the adverse scenarios will serve as inputs in the computations of individual bank’s losses
from the market risk.
Around 6 % and 1 % appreciations of dinar against the euro (2010 values) favour
the households whose loans are denominated in euro, but negatively affect the
exporting companies. The inflation remains the same as in the baseline scenario
due to the time lag. Concerning the market risk, we assume the NBS to raise its
key interest rate by 1% more than in the baseline scenario. The exchange rates
of dinar against euro and US dollar follow the same direction as in the baseline
case, but the changes are larger (see Table 5.4). In the following section we will
use the results of teh scenario analysis to calculate the market and the credit
risks for Croatia and Serbia.
5.2 Credit Risk
In Chapter 3 we discussed the risks to which the bank can be exposed. The
credit risk is the main risk that banks face due to their role of the interme-
diary between the agents with the surplus and those with the shortage of re-
sources. Granting loans is the unfinished transaction until the debt is fully
repaid (Mejstrˇ´ık, Pecˇena´, & Teply´ 2008, p. 253). There always exists the
threat that the debtor will not meet its obligations and that the loan or its
part will not be repaid, which will cause the loss in the bank’s accounting
books. Revealing its key role in banks’ exposures, authors that deal with the
banking sector stress testing usually model this type of risk (see Boss 2002,
Virolainen 2004 or Jakub´ık & Schmieder 2008).
As discussed in Chapter 3, there are few approaches how to set the macro
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credit risk model. Chapter 4 introduced the models for the Croatian and the
Serbian corporate and household sectors that were developed according to ap-
proach originated by Wilson (1997a,b). The models estimated the sectors’
default rates according to the movements of the specific macroeconomic fac-
tors. In this section, we will apply the baseline and the adverse scenarios from
Section 5.1 to the models developed in Chapter 4. The results will be the
Croatian and the Serbian corporate and household sectors’ default rates es-
timated for the Q4 2011. The default rates will be used as the probabilities
of default for the calculation of the credit risk losses in the individual bank’s
loan books.13. The expected and the unexpected credit risk losses are usually
calculated according to Basel II principles (see BCBS 2006). In our study we
will assume only the expected losses, the method used in i.e. in Jakub´ık &
Sutton (2011). The expected credit risk losses can be calculated as follows:
credit losst+1 = PDt+1 × LGDt × EADt (5.1)
where PD denotes the probability of default expressed in terms of the de-
fault rate, LGD stands for the loss given default and EAD is the exposure at
default in time t. Jakub´ık & Sutton (2011) suggest to measure EAD as the
difference between the outstanding loans and the NPLs in time t. The loss
given default will be set on the level proposed in Basel II under the founda-
tion approach for the senior claims on corporates, sovereigns and banks with
no recognised collateral (45%, BCBS 2006, p. 67) for Croatia. In the case of
Serbia we will raise this level to 55%, reflecting the higher uncertainty in the
Serbian economic conditions.14
13For the sake of simplicity we assume the individual banks’ portfolio to be homogeneous.
Accordingly, we can apply the default rates estimated on the banking sector’s level on the
individual banks. Note that we have developed two different models for the country’s cor-
porate and household sectors that provide the two different default rates. We will divide
the bank’s portfolio into the loans to corporations and the loans to consumers in order to
distinct the loans with different probabilities of default. In the calculation of the credit risk
loss of the individual bank the losses from the corporate and household loans will be added
together.
14As of March 2011, Standard & Poor’s provide Croatia and Serbia with ratings BBB+
and BB, respectively (ratings available at http:/www.standardnadpoors.com). The rating of
Croatia suggests that the economy has the adequate capacity to meet the financial obligations
but also that the economy is the subject to adverse economic conditions, whereas Serbian
BB rating suggests that the economy is less vulnerable to the shocks in the near–term but
it faces ongoing uncertainties to the adverse economic conditions.
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5.2.1 Croatia
This subsection analyses possible future development of the specific–sector’s
default rates in Croatia. The baseline and adverse scenarios are employed. We
estimate the default rates in the one year horizon, starting in the late 2010 and
ending in the last quarter of 2011. We are particularly focused on the values
of Q4 2011, which will be used as a measures of probability of default in the
individual banks’ credit portfolios.
Let us recall the regression equations for Croatian corporate and household
sector credit risk models elaborated in Chapter 4. The dependent variables,
the probabilities of default, will be expressed in terms of NPL ratio, previously
denoted as npl corp and npl hh. From now, we symbolise them as PD corp
and PD hh15:
ln
(
P̂Dcorp,t
1− P̂Dcorp,t
)
= −2.4229− 3.6435g hrt−4 + 0.0779rt−4 + 3.5724pit−3
+1.0648er usdt−2 + 0.2440dum1t + 0.3347dum2t + t
(5.2)
ln
(
P̂Dhh,t
1− P̂Dhh,t
)
= −3.0912− 1.8276g hrt−2 + 1.7730ut−3 + 3.2625pit−5
+0.5417dum1t + 0.2026dum2t + t
(5.3)
where PD corpt and PD hht are the banking sector’s probabilities of de-
fault of loans provided to corporations and households, respectively. The GDP
growth rate in Croatia is denoted by g hr, r is the growth rate of the real
interest rate, er usd is the growth rate of the HRK/USD exchange rate, u is
the growth rate of teh unemployment rate, pi stands for the inflation measured
by teh CPI and dum1 and dum2 are the dummy variables that adjust models
for structural breaks that for 2011 have 0 values and thus do not influence the
model.
We put the projected values from 2011 scenario analysis in the equation
15We are fully aware that the representation of the probabilities of default in terms of
NPLs ratio is only an approximation that is used due to the lack of data on the probabilities
of default.
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Table 5.5: Credit risk macro stress–testing results for the actual, the
baseline and the adverse scenarios in Croatia.
Actual (%) Baseline (%) Adverse (%)
Corporate default rate 14.34 8.30 12.15
Relative to actual scenario – -42% -15%
Household default rate 7.73 6.53 9.13
Relative to actual scenario – -15.5% +18%
Source: Author’s computations. The actual scenario refers to Q2 2010 and shows known
values, the baseline and the adverse scenarios refers to Q4 2011.
(see Section 5.1.1) and we arrive at the sector–specific probabilities of default
(PDs) for the adverse and the baseline scenarios in Croatia for the fourth quar-
ter of 2011. Table 5.5 summarises the results and Figures 5.1 and 5.2 provide
the graphical presentation of our findings, depicting the differences in PD’s
movements for both scenarios and sectors. The corporate sector probability of
default is lower than the Q2 2010 value for both scenarios (8.3% and 12.15%
for the baseline and the adverse scenarios in comparison to the 14.34 % proba-
bility of default in Q2 2010). In the baseline case this reflects the assumption
of economic recovery in Croatia in 2011 that should positively influence the
corporates’ creditworthiness. In the adverse scenario the probability of default
increases relative to the baseline scenario but it does not reach the 2010 level.
Although we set the scenario to reflect the shock in the economy, the depen-
dence of the macro credit risk model on the past values of the indicators causes
that the full reflection of the shock will appear later.
In the case of households, the decrease of the probability of default in the
baseline scenario (-15.5% is not so noticeable as in the case of firms (-42%).
However, given the different time lag structure of the household’s model, the
impact of the adverse shock translates into the higher PD than was that ob-
served in the past. Namely, the estimated credit risk model for the households
reacts more swiftly on the GDP growth. Households do not profit from the
appreciation of kuna against US dollar as firms do (see table 5.1). As a result
the PD is by 18 % higher in the case of shock than the PD from Q2 2010.
5.2.2 Serbia
In the case of Serbia, the projected sector–specific probability of default in the
fourth quarter of 2011 for the baseline and adverse scenario is calculated, using
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Figure 5.1: Baseline and adverse scenarios for the corporate sector in
Croatia.
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Figure 5.2: Baseline and adverse scenarios for the household sector in
Croatia.
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the estimated macro credit risk models in Chapter 4 and projected macroeco-
nomic variables from the scenario analysis at the beginning of this chapter. The
regression equations for the Serbian corporate and household sector elaborated
in Chapter 4 now express the sector–specific probabilities of default. They are
as follows:
ln
(
P̂Dcorp,t
1− P̂Dcorp,t
)
= −1.2588− 1.2061g srbt−4 − 6.0872g eut
−1.0998er eurt−1 − 0.6843dumt
(5.4)
ln
(
P̂Dhh,t
1− P̂Dhh,t
)
= −2.1873 + 1.1616er eurt + 1.6337ut
+0.5167it−3 − 5.1918pit−4 − 0.1806dumt
(5.5)
where PD corpt and PD hht are the banking sector’s probabilities of de-
fault of loans provided to corporations and households, respectively. The GDP
growth rate in Serbia and the EU 15 are denoted by g srb and g eu, respec-
tively. The growth rate of the RSD/EUR exchange rate is er eur, u is the
growth rate of the unemployment rate, i is teh growth rate of the nominal
interest rate, pi stands for the inflation measured by PPI and dum is dummy
variable that adjust models for structural break, which is zero for 2011.
Table 5.6: Credit risk macro stress–testing results for the actual, the
baseline and the adverse scenarios in Serbia.
Actual (%) Baseline (%) Adverse (%)
Corporate default rate 19.63 20.22 25.21
Relative to actual scenario – +3% +28%
Household default rate 7.81 4.78 6.58
Relative to actual scenario – -39% -16%
Source: Author’s computations. The actual scenario refers to Q3 2010 and shows known
values, the baseline and the adverse scenarios refers to Q4 2011.
We utilise the data estimated in the scenario analysis for Serbia in Sec-
tion 5.1 and we obtain the corporate and the household sector probabilities
of default for the end of 2011. Table 5.6 shows the results. Contrary to the
estimations in the Croatian case, the Serbian corporate sector demonstrates
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higher PDs both in the baseline and the adverse scenarios compared to the
Q3 2011 values. The baseline scenario outcome can signal that firms are more
rigid in the responses to economic changes in Serbia due to, for example, fixed
contracts. Alternatively, the findings might indicate some difficulties in the
corporate sector’s repayment discipline that are still present, regardless the
stage of the business cycle.16 Figure 5.3 points out the possible stabilisation
tendency at the end of the considered period for the baseline situation.
Figure 5.3: Baseline and adverse scenarios for the corporate sector in
Serbia.
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The household sector’s PDs suggest the large decrease in the baseline situ-
ation (-39%) and the elevated decrease (-16%) in the case of the shock, demon-
strating the opposite situation than that of firms. The lower PDs under the
adverse scenario probably arise from the shape of the model where many vari-
ables are expressed in the lagged values. Especially, the inflation rate of 16%
that enters the credit risk model of the household sector is elevated and favours
Serbian households. The relative sensitivity of the model to the inflation further
enhances the effect of the inflation (see Equation 5.5). All in all, promising eco-
nomic conditions at the end of 2010 from the households’ point of view causes
households’ PDs to decrease in both scenarios. Still, from the mid–2011 the
16Note that the increase in the PDs in the baseline scenario (+3%) is not very large,
whereas in the adverse scenario an increase is much sharper (+28%).
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PDs tend to increase. The question would be what values the PDs would reach
in 2012 if the unfavourable conditions remained. Figures 5.3 and 5.4 show
the evolution of the corporate and the household default rates for the baseline
and the adverse scenario. The spread between the baseline and the adverse
value at the end of the period is wider for firms than for households, with the
difference of 5%, compared to around 2% for households.
Figure 5.4: Baseline and adverse scenarios for the household sector in
Serbia.
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5.3 Market Risk
This section provides the insight into the computation of market risk. The
market risk is the risk of losses in the balance sheet and the off–balance sheet
items caused by the changes in teh market prices. Basel II framework (see
BCBS 2006) distinguishes the market risk into: 1) the interest rate risk of
instruments and equities in the trading book, and 2) the foreign exchange rate
risk and commodities risk. In our study we consider the interest rate and the
exchange rate risks, both of which have direct and indirect impact on the banks’
loan books. The indirect impact is, however, incorporated in the computation
of the credit risk as it results from the impact of the changes in rates on the
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debtors’ ability to repay the debt. Hence, we will explicitly assess only the
direct impact of these two risks on the bank losses.
5.3.1 Interest Rate Risk
In our study the interest rate risk arouses from the marked–to–market bonds
held by bank. The increase in interest rate causes the loss from holding these
instruments. Apart from the original value of the bonds we employ the data
on duration. The duration is according to FSI Compilation Guide (IMF 2006,
paragraphs 3.51–3.56) the financial instrument’s weighted average term to ma-
turity. In our case the duration is approximated by the residual maturity, which
is provided in the individual banks’ financial statements.17
The interest rate losses are calculated as follows:
interest rate losst+1 = Vt ×Dt ×∆irt+1 (5.6)
where V denotes the original value of the bond, D is the duration and ∆ir
is the change in interest rate in time t. Cˇiha´k (2007) also consider another
source of the interest rate risk–the maturity gap between interest sensitive
assets and liabilities. However, we believe it is appropriate to calculate the gain
or the loss from maturity gap as part of the interest income. The calculation
is demonstrated in Section 5.3.3.
5.3.2 Foreign Exchange Rate Risk
The net open positions in the foreign currencies are subjects to the foreign
exchange rate risk. FX risk is related to the changes in the exchange rate of
domestic currency against individual foreign currencies. The net open position
in the particular currency is defined as the net spot position plus relevant off–
balance sheet derivatives. More specifically it is the sum of the value of assets
held in foreign currency, minus the value of liabilities in that currency, plus the
value of foreign currency financial derivatives. The calculation of the foreign
risk loss arising from the exchange rate changes in the particular currency can
be written as:
foreign exchange rate losst+1 = −NOPt ×∆ert+1 (5.7)
17This definition is, however, valid only for the zero coupon instruments, but due to the
lack of data and for the sake of simplicity we used it for all instruments. For an exact formula,
see FSI Compilation Guide (IMF 2006).
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where NOP denotes the net open position in the particular currency and
∆er stands for the change of the exchange rate of the domestic currency against
the given foreign currency in time t, all in domestic currency units.18 For more
detailed discussion about the calculation of the foreign exchange loss, see Cˇiha´k
(2007, pp. 34–35).
5.3.3 Interest Income Projection
The calculation of the direct impact of the interest rate change on the bank’s
portfolio when the sensitivities of its assets and liabilities are mismatched can
be found in Cˇiha´k (2007). We assess the impact of the interest rate change on
the interest income and expenses. The net inflow of interest arises from the
maturity gap between the inflow of interest from holding assets and outflow of
interest on the liability side of the balance sheet. If the maturity gap is positive
then the increase in the interest rates leads to the gains that appear as a part
of the interest income in the income statement. In the next chapter we will
add these gains to the profit as a part of the buffer for potential losses. The
interest rate gain is calculated as follows:
interest rate gaint+1 = G×∆irt+1 (5.8)
where G is the cumulative maturity gap between the interest sensitive assets
and liabilities and ∆ir is the change in the interest rate in time t. When the
interest rate increases, the positive maturity gap results in the gains from the
interest rate change and vice versa.
In the following chapter we will apply derived equations on the individual
banks’ portfolios in Croatia and Serbia. We will the calculate capital adequacy
ratio (CAR) for the baseline and the adverse scenario for the individual banks
and we will discuss possible policy implications arising from our findings.
18Note that we express the exchange rate in the units of domestic currency per the unit
of foreign currency throughout the study. Thus, the positive exchange rate change signals
the depreciation of the domestic currency, which translates into the FX gain if the net open
position is positive. As we defined the dependent variable as the foreign exchange rate risk
loss, we put the negative sign on the right side of the equation. Then the negative loss
expresses the gain. The similar approach will be used in the next chapter in order to assess
the exchange rate risk in individual banks’ portfolios.
Chapter 6
Stress Testing Results
6.1 Overall Banking Sector Environment
This chapter illustrates the application of the stress testing on the individual
banks in Croatia and Serbia. For this purpose, we used macroeconomic factors
from the end of 2010 and we projected their values for the last quarter of
2011 under the baseline and the adverse scenario (see Chapter 5). The banks
represent the major part of the banking sectors in Croatia and Serbia. In order
to estimate the impact of the scenarios on the banks’ performance in 2011, we
approximated the banks’ 2010 financial results by the data derived from the
end of 2009. This approximation was necessary due to the delays in submitting
the banks’financial reports.1.
In Croatia, the total banking system’s (BS’s) assets in 2009 were 378.4
billion HRK. In our analysis, we have chosen the 9 biggest banks that account
for 92.6% of the total banking system’s assets. According to the ownership
structure, there were 15 foreign–owned banks (90.9% of the BS’s assets), 17
private domestic banks (4.9% of total BS’s assets) and 2 state–owned banks
(4.2% of total BS’s assets).
In Serbia, the total BS’s assets in 2009 were 2 160 billion RSD. We inves-
tigate the 10 biggest banks, which account for 70% of the total BS’s assets.
Regarding the ownership structure, there were 20 foreign–owned banks (74.3%
of total BS’s assets), 4 private domestic banks (8.2% of total BS’s assets) and
10 state–owned banks (17.5% of total BS’s assets) in Serbia. The selected
1The financial reports were obtained from the database Bankscope, available at
http://www.bvdinfo.com. If the data were not available in Bankscope, we utilise the in-
dividual financial reports of the banks.
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banks are either medium–sized or large banks.2 The portion of selected banks’
assets to the total BS’s assets suggests that the Serbian banking sector is less
concentrated than the banking sector in Croatia. Tables 6.1 and 6.2 provide
the description of the Croatian and the Serbian banking systems.
Table 6.1: Assets and ownership structure of the selected banks in
Croatia (in HRK billion).
Total 9 selected Selected banks
BS banks in % of total BS
Assets 378 348 91.9
Number of FB 15 8 53.3
Assets of FB 344 334 97.0
Number of PB 17 0 0.00
Assets of PB 19 0 0.00
Number of SB 2 1 0.5
Assets of SB 16 14 88.0
Source: Author’s computations. Data are from the CNB’s on–line database and of the end of
2009. BS is banking system, FB, PB and SB denote foreign–owned, private domestic–owned
and state–owned bank.
6.2 Stress Testing of the Individual Banks
In this section we set up the equations for the calculation of the bank’s capi-
tal adequacy ratio (CAR). The losses from the individual risks are computed
according to the models provided in Sections 5.2 and 5.3 in Chapter 5. The
bank’s capital adequacy ratio (CAR) in time t+ 1 can be expressed as follows:
CARt+1 =
(
Capt + Profitt+1 − Credit losst+1 −Market losst+1
RWAt −∆NPLt+1
)
(6.1)
where Cap is the regulatory capital. Bank’s profit Profit is the last 3–year
average net income3 plus the net interest rate gain/loss from the movements in
the interest rates, calculated in Equation 5.8 in Chapter 5. Variable Credit loss
2Size of the bank is defined in terms of the amount of bank’s assets relative to the total
banking system’ assets. The small bank is the bank with the assets’ share of less 1% of the
total assets, the medium-sized bank’s assets range from 1% to 5% of the total assets, and
the large bank’s assets account for more than 5% of the total assets.
3Alternatively, we can use the net income of the last available year.
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Table 6.2: Assets and ownership structure of the selected banks in
Serbia (in RSD billion).
Total 10 selected Selected banks
BS banks in % of total BS
Assets 2 160 1 512 70.0
Number of FB 20 8 40.0
Assets of FB 1 605 1 184 73.7
Number of PB 4 1 25.0
Assets of PB 177 109 61.7
Number of SB 10 1 10.0
Assets of SB 378 219 58.0
Source: Author’s computations. Data are from the NBS’s Fourth Quarter Report (2009)
and of the end of 2009. BS is banking system, FB, PB and SB denote foreign–owned, private
domestic–owned and state–owned bank.
is the credit risk loss expressed in Equation 5.1, Market loss is the market risk
loss that arise from the movements in the interest rate and foreign exchange
rates (Equations 5.6 and 5.7), RWA are the risk–weighted assets and ∆NPL
is the inflow of new NPLs with the risk weight of 100%.4Time t represents the
end of 2010, however the banks’ data are from the end of 2009 as was discussed
above. We implicitly assume, that bank keeps all its profit and does not dis-
tribute it among shareholders, which might not be true in reality, especially if
the gained profit is large. However, the estimation of the amount of retained
profit is not usually available. The assumption might lead to elevated values
of the CAR. Some banks’ results provide the large CARs, i.e. 30–50% (see
Tables 6.3 and 6.4). In reality the values could be lower if we assumed the part
of the profit was redistributed.
The RWA are reduced by the inflow of new NPLs. It is the consequence
of the increase in provisioning requirements that the bank should undertake
when the NPLs are increasing (see Cˇiha´k 2007, p. 29). A common assumption
is that the increase in NPLs will be fully subtracted from the RWA. In reality,
the choice of the risk weights depends on the distribution of the NPLs across
the categories of risks of assets. This information is usually not available.
4The risk weight of 100% for the NPLs is the commonly accepted approximation and it
was used i.e. in Cˇiha´k (2007).
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According to Jakub´ık & Sutton (2011) the inflow of new NPLs can be
expressed as:
∆NPLt+1 = NPLt+1 −NPLt (6.2)
NPLt+1 = NPLt + PDt × (Loanst −NPLt)− r ×NPLt (6.3)
where PD is the probability of default, Loans are the current loans in the
portfolio, and r is the average write–off (or sell–out) rate of existing NPLs.
We have estimated the default probability for the corporate and the household
sectors separately. All variables that enter Equation 6.1 are divided according
to sector to which they refer. In the final computation we add all partial results
together. The write–off rates varied extremely across the institutions and over
time. In 2009, some institutions wrote off only a subtle part of their loans.
Hence, in 2010, we supposed they might increase the write–offs (see Table C.1
in Appendix C). In order to unify the conditions of banks and to set them in
the realistic fashion, we use the average write–off rate of and we employ it on
all banks
6.3 Results
This section provides the stress–testing results of the 9 largest banks in Croatia
and the 10 largest banks in Serbia. In terms of assets, the banks cover the 92%
and 70% of the size of the banking sector in Croatia and Serbia, respectively.
Although we use the real banks’ data that are publicly available, we decided not
to explicitly identify the banks. This study aims to illustrate the application of
the stress tests to the real banks’ portfolios and to reveal the possible threats
to financial stability in the given countries, not to provide the implications to
the individual banks. Also for the sake of simplicity we provide the banks with
the letters in an alphabetical order.
Before we provide the results of the stress tests run on the individual banks
we should discuss some modifications that we have done in the bank’s sam-
ple. In some banks, not all necessary data were available. In that case we
approximated them or we made some simplifying assumptions. Particularly,
we assumed for all banks that their net open positions are all in euro due to the
limited information on all open positions. This assumption does not distort the
results a lot as the foreign exchange rates are usually highly correlated (for il-
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lustration, see correlation matrices in Appendix B). Similarly, we approximated
banks’ NPLs by the impaired loans, as data on the NPLs were not available
in the major part of the banks. Again, there is a high correlation between
the NPLs and impaired loans because the impaired loans are the part of the
NPLs. Some data were available only on the consolidated basis in the database
Bankscope. It concerns the one bank in Croatia and the three banks in Serbia.
In that cases, however the bank’s operations represented the major part of the
group’s financial statements, thus the approximation does not disturb the real
conditions heavily.
For the Bank D in Croatia we approximated the regulatory capital and
risk–weighted assets by averaging other banks’ regulatory capital/RWA and
total capital/total assets, dividing them and multiplying the particular bank’s
total capital/total assets with the obtained coefficient (see Table 6.3). The
same procedure applied in Serbia for the Banks E and H (see Tables 6.3 and
6.4). Next, for the Bank F in Croatia the data on available–for–sale securities
were not provided and we did not assume them in the computations. As a
consequence, this bank does not show any losses from the interest rate move-
ments and its CAR can be overestimated. Similarly, there were not data on
the net open positions of the Bank H and we did not compute the loss or the
gain from the change in the exchange rate. Finally, the Bank G did not report
its maturity gap analysis for the interest rate risk. The possible gains or losses
were not added to the regulatory capital in the CAR computation. In the case
of Serbia, there were not data on the maturity gap for the Bank D.
The results of the stress tests are demonstrated in Table 6.3 for the Croatian
banking sector and in Table 6.4 for the Serbian banking sector. The results
depend on the considered scenarios and models, therefore the outcome can
change easily if we change some assumptions. The capital adequacy ratios are
provided for the initial situation, the baseline scenario and the adverse scenario.
In both countries the regulatory minimum CAR is set by the national banks
on the level of 12%.5
5The threshold of 12% is relatively elevated in comparison with the other banking sectors.
In the EU the CAR’s threshold is 8%.
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In the case of Croatia, we consider the six large banks with the individual
total assets accounting for more than 5% of the total BS’s assets. There are
also three medium–sized banks with the asset share in the range between 1%
and 5% of the total assets in the banking system. Under the initial scenario
that describes the situation in the end of 2010 there is one bank with the CAR
lower than the regulatory minimum requirement (Bank B). Given that these
values are actually from 2009 and that the CNB raised its minimum CAR re-
quirements in April 2010, this bank formally did not violate the requirements.
The highest CAR reaches almost 25% (Bank H). The majority of banks demon-
strate the ratio below 20%. Three banks with the lowest values demonstrate
the lowest CARs also under the baseline and the adverse scenarios. The banks’
CARs under the initial, the baseline and the adverse scenarios are lined up in
Figure 6.1.
Figure 6.1: Banks’ CAR according to the scenario in Croatia.
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
Bank A Bank B Bank C Bank D Bank E Bank F Bank G Bank H Bank I All banks
Banks' CAR in Croatia
initial CAR baseline CAR adverse CAR min CAR
Source: Author’s computations.
All Croatian banks show the positive profits apart from the Bank B. The
loss of the Bank B is caused by the relatively large loss in the last reported year
and by the loss from the maturity gap between the interest sensitive assets and
liabilities. Although the gains of the Bank B from the market prices changes are
almost the same as the credit risk losses the bank’s CAR deteriorates under
the adverse scenario (from 10.13% to 8.39%) and falls below the regulatory
threshold. Accordingly, the Bank A and the Bank G slightly fall below the
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Figure 6.2: Banks’ CAR according to the scenario in Serbia.
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
Bank A Bank B Bank C Bank D Bank E Bank F Bank G Bank H Bank I Bank J All 
banks
Banks' CAR in Serbia
initial CAR baseline CAR adverse CAR min CAR
Source: Author’s computations.
threshold level under the adverse scenario. Four of nine banks experience the
gains from the interest rate and the foreign exchange rate movements under the
scenarios, even though under the adverse scenario the gains are lower. Under
the baseline scenario, the aggregate market risk gain (the column “all banks”
in Table 6.3) is of 60% higher than the loss from the credit risk (in absolute
values). The significance of the market risk share relative to the credit risk
share in the CAR noticeably declines under the adverse scenario.
The approximated Serbian sector consists of the six large banks and the
four banks of the medium size. The initial situation demonstrates the elevated
CARs for all banks. The elevated CARs could suggest that the banks in Serbia
might be very conservative and might keep a large capital buffer against the
potential losses. One of the banks experiences the drop below the regulatory
CAR requirement (Bank F) in the baseline scenario and two banks fall below
the threshold under the adverse scenario (Bank H and Bank F). The Bank A
demonstrates the highest CAR under all scenarios.6 The high value of the CAR
in the Bank A can results from the relatively favourable net open FX positions
and the large profits. The Bank A is the only bank in the Serbian banking
6Note that we assume that banks keep the profits and do not redistribute them between
the shareholders. It is not unlikely that the Bank A with the CAR of more than 40% would
redistribute at least the part of its profit. In reality, the CAR of the Bank A could be lower.
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sector’s sample that shows the higher share of the market risk gain/loss to the
regulatory capital in comparison to the credit risk loss share to the regulatory
capital. The other banks do not involve in the market risk operations a lot. It
is noticeable relative to the Croatian banks’ market risk results. The aggregate
CAR shows the relatively high values under all scenarios. The banks’ CARs
under the initial situation, the baseline and the adverse scenarios are lined up
in Figure 6.2.
The results of the movements in the market prices of the FX positions or
the bonds can significantly vary across the scenarios. The “good” positions
in the FX or the bond market can favour banks and can create the gains.
But the market position are an unstable source of the gain because they highly
depends on the situation on the financial markets that is continuously evolving.
For illustration, Figures C.1, C.2, C.3 and C.4 in Appendix C demonstrate
the relative significance of the credit risk loss, the interest rate loss and the
foreign exchange rate loss in terms of the regulatory capital according to the
scenario. The interest rate risk does not appear to be significant neither under
the baseline nor adverse scenario but the relative significance of the credit risk
and the foreign exchange rate risk changes according to the employed scenario.
Under the baseline scenario (Figure C.1 in Appendix C) the four Croatian
banks out of nine demonstrate the higher portion of the foreign exchange rate
risk gains to the capital than is the portion of credit risk losses to the capital.
The relative instability of the gains or the losses from the net open FX positions
is illustrated in Figure C.2 in Appendix C. Under the adverse scenario the gains
are much smaller (accounting for about 8% of the regulatory capital, compared
to the more than 20% of the regulatory capital under the baseline scenario).
On the other hand, the losses from the credit risk increase slightly under the
baseline scenario (from the less than 20% to the more than 20% of the regula-
tory capital). In the case of the Serbian banks the market risk gains/losses are
significant only in a few banks and only the Bank A shows higher portion of
the FX gain than of the credit risk loss relative to the regulatory capital under
adverse scenario (see Figures C.3 and C.4 in Appendix C).
Figures 6.3, 6.4, 6.5 and 6.6 demonstrates the evolution of the banks’ ag-
gregate CAR and aggregate NPL ratio in Croatia and Serbia under the baseline
and the adverse scenarios. The three year horizon is applied. The time t de-
notes the year 2010. In the case of Croatia the aggregate CAR under the
baseline scenario increases, whereas under the adverse scenario it slightly de-
creases. In the case of Serbia, the CAR decreases under the both scenarios.
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Figure 6.3: Aggregate banks’ CAR according to the scenario in Croa-
tia.
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Figure 6.4: Aggregate banks’ CAR according to the scenario in Ser-
bia.
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The figures that depict the development of the NPL ratio show that the NPL
ratios increases rapidly in the both countries under the both scenarios. The
sample period is relatively small but the evolution of the variables might signal
that there could be the tendency of the increasing non–performing loans rela-
tive to the total loans in Croatia and Serbia. Accordingly, the evolution of the
CARs points out the decreasing trend.
Figure 6.5: Aggregate banks’ NPL ratio according to the scenario in
Croatia.
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The stress test results on the individual banks’ level demonstrate the impact
of the shock that is translated into the credit and the market risks and expressed
in terms of the CARs. We provide the estimation of the overall impact as
well as its decomposition into the individual risks. The tables and the figures
provide the individual banks’results as well as the aggregate banking sector’s
results that is represented by the selected banks. In overall, the stress–testing
results confirm that the banking systems in Croatia and Serbia are robust and
able to withstand both the most likely future conditions and the economic
deterioration. Only a minor part of the banks face difficulties with fulfilling of
the minimum CAR requirements. On the other hand, the ’ CARs of particular
banks are elevated and that indicates that these banks could redistribute the
profit and lower the capital buffer. In the next section we will discuss some
policy implications that arise from the stress–testing results.
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Figure 6.6: Aggregate banks’ NPL ratio according to the scenario in
Serbia.
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6.4 Policy Implications
The estimation of the CARs of the major banks in Croatia and Serbia and their
comparison to the regulatory minimum CAR allow us to assess the banking
sector stability in each country. As Cˇiha´k (2007, p. 53) argues, the CAR
does not capture all possible macro effects that arise from the simulated shocks
but it can indicate potential fiscal costs of preventing the banks to fail. It is
relevant to consider whether the particular bank is state–owned, private–owned
or foreign–owned bank. The government would most likely bail–out the state–
owned banks if they failed. But it is uncertain whether the government would
help also the private and the foreign banks that faced the distress. For the
banks that belong to the group “too big to fail”, the government usually does
not have any other option than to provide them with the capital injection. The
size of the bank and its ownership structure is particularly important in our
study due to the fact that the major part of the banking sectors in Croatia and
Serbia is controlled by the foreign banks.
Section 6.3 revealed the banks that cannot withstand the economic con-
ditions under the baseline and the adverse scenarios. Table 6.5 indicates the
amount of additional resources that would be necessary to inject in the insti-
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tutions (usually in form of the capital) in order to bring their CARs to the
minimum regulatory level. Under the baseline scenario the potential injection
that would be needed for the stressed bank accounts for 0.016% and 0.06% of
domestic GDP in Croatia and Serbia, respectively.
Under the adverse scenario the amount of the capital needed increases of
844 million HRK in the case of Croatia and of 7 255 million RSD in the Serbia
case (see Table 6.5). The values of the injections correspond to the 0.27% share
of the GDP in Croatia and the 0.33% share of the GDP in Serbia. In terms of
the ownership structure the undercapitalised banks in Croatia are two foreign
banks and one state–owned bank. The undercapitalised banks in Serbia are
one foreign and one state–owned bank.
Table 6.5: Injection needed to meet the minimum CAR (in mil. of
national currency).
Croatia Croatia Serbia Serbia
Scenario Baseline Adverse Baseline Adverse
Bank A No need 324.6 No need No need
Bank B No need 351.7 No need No need
Bank C No need No need No need No need
Bank D No need No need No need No need
Bank E No need No need No need No need
Bank F No need No need 1 630.6 7 082.4
Bank G 52.0 219.8 No need No need
Bank H No need No need No need 1 803.4
Bank I No need No need No need No need
Bank J – – No need No need
Total 52.0 896.1 1 630.6 8 885.7
Share of GDP2009 0.016% 0.267% 0.060% 0.327%
Source: Author’s computations. Currencies: Croatian kuna and Serbian dinar. Share of
GDP: total injection needed as a portion of domestic GDP. Data on GDP are in current
prices of 2009 because 2010 values were not available yet. Note that the capital injection is
calculated without reflecting any developments affecting the banks’ capital or its structure
since the end–2009.
Figures 6.7, 6.8, 6.9 and 6.10 provide an interesting insight into the
relative position of all banks according to the level of their CAR, NPL ratio
and size. The NPL ratio represents the portion of NPLs to the total loans in
time t+1 and bank size is set in terms of the bank’s assets to the total banking
sector’s assets.
The banks in Croatia demonstrate similar positions in terms of the NPL
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Figure 6.7: Bubble chart of the NPL ratio, the CAR and the asset
share for the baseline scenario in Croatia.
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Figure 6.8: Bubble chart of the NPL ratio, the CAR and the asset
share for the adverse scenario in Croatia.
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ratio. They vary in the CAR values (Figures 6.7 and 6.8). We can distinguish
the two banks that are relatively close to the 12 % CAR bound under the base-
line scenario and three banks that are below this threshold under the adverse
scenario. One of those banks is large compared to the other banks, the second
one is medium–sized and the third one belongs to the group of smaller banks
(specifically Banks A, B and G). The Banks A and G are the foreign–owned in-
stitutions and the Bank B is the state–owned bank. If the banks were about to
fail, the government would take the steps to maintain the financial stability in
the country. Most likely the government would bail–out the state–owned Bank
B that is the smallest bank under the distress but with the largest amount of
missing capital. Bank A is relatively large bank in the banking system and it
would be unlikely that the government would let the Bank A to fail. The ques-
tion could be what would happen with the Bank G that is neither “too big”
nor state–owned, and under the adverse scenario it could demand the injection
of almost 220 million HRK.
Figure 6.9: Bubble chart of the NPL ratio, the CAR and the asset
share for the baseline scenario in Serbia.
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
HI
J
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35% 40% 45% 50%
N
P
L
 r
at
io
CAR
Relative position of the banks according to their CAR, NPL ratio 
and size - baseline scenario
Source: Author’s computations.
In the case of Serbia, the banks are dispersed both in terms of the NPL
ratio and the CAR (Figures 6.9 and 6.10). Relatively large Bank F can be
found below the threshold of 12% under the both scenarios. Moreover, under
the adverse scenario, Bank H also falls below the threshold. The banks below
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Figure 6.10: Bubble chart of the NPL ratio, the CAR and the asset
share for the adverse scenario in Serbia.
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the 12 % CAR bound in Serbia are one state–owned and one foreign–owned
bank. In the Serbian case the larger bank is the state–owned, which we believe
would be bailout in the case it failed. The situation of the relatively small
foreign–owned Bank H is uncertain. In order to bail–out both banks under
the adverse scenario, the Serbian government would need the injection of 8 886
million RSD. It represents the 0.33% share of domestic GDP. In comparison
with the Croatian case (0.27%), the share of GDP in Serbia that would be
needed to bailout the banks under the adverse scenario is slightly higher.
Both the adverse and the baseline scenarios are constructed as “what if”
scenarios. We aimed to assess the capital buffer that would help to prevent
banking failures if one of the scenario occurred. We do not assess the probability
that these scenario will occur. As for the banks in the Croatian and Serbian
banking sectors that proved enough level of CAR under the both scenarios, the
stress tests can confirm their robustness and capacity to absorb losses, as well
as the overall financial health of the economies.
Chapter 7
Conclusion
This thesis reviewed the macro stress–testing methodology and applied it on
the real aggregate and the individual bank’s data in Croatia and Serbia. The
aim of the study was to answer the questions whether we are able to build the
macro stress–testing framework using the publicly available data for Croatia
and Serbia and whether the stress tests can reveal possible risks to the indi-
vidual banks and the threats to the financial stability in the countries. The
outcome of the study demonstrates that even with limited data the consis-
tent stress tests could be developed under the simplifying assumptions. In
Chapter 6, we have shown there are some banks that can have problems with
fulfilling the regulatory minimum capital requirements both under the baseline
and the adverse scenarios. Accordingly, the calculated capital injection that
should prevent banks from possible failures reflects the potential fiscal costs to
the government.
The baseline and the adverse scenarios were set to project the macroeco-
nomic variables for the end of 2011. The baseline scenario described the most
likely future situation using the various macroeconomic forecasts. The adverse
scenario reflected the situation that occurred during the recent crisis, thus,
the data originated in 2008–2010. The macro stress tests were constructed in
such a way that they capture the linkage between the macroeconomic factors
(GDP growth, inflation rate, interest rate etc.) and banks’ balance–sheet items
through the macro credit risk models, which were based on Wilson (1997a,b)
approach. The models expressed the dependent variable in the logistic function
form. For each country the models were developed for the corporate and the
household sectors separately, reflecting the sectors’ diverse sensitivities to the
various macro factors. These satellite models estimated the sector–specific de-
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fault rates (expressed in terms of the non–performing loans to the total loans)
for the end of 2011 using the past data and 2011 macro forecasts. The default
rates were then used for the calculation of the individual banks’ losses that
arose from the credit risk exposures. For each bank we estimated also the mar-
ket risk losses. Banks’ balance–sheet data were those of 2009 due to the time
lag in their publishing. Both losses entered in the computation of the capital
adequacy ratios (CARs) under the baseline and the adverse scenario in the end
of 2011.
In the case of Croatia, we considered the nine largest banks that accounted
for more than 90% of the total banking sector assets in 2009. Under the base-
line scenario we detected one foreign–owned large bank that had the CAR
below the regulatory minimum level of 12%. Under the adverse scenario, there
emerged two more banks with the CAR below the threshold, one of them was
medium–sized state–owned bank and the second one was large foreign–owned
bank. Under the adverse scenario, the estimated capital injection that would
be needed to bring these banks to the level of CAR of 12% amounted for almost
0.27% of the 2009 GDP in Croatia. In Serbia, we analysed ten major banks
that accounted for 70% of the banking sector assets in 2009. Similarly to the
situation in Croatia, there was one state–owned bank that did not fulfil the
capital requirements under the baseline scenario and two banks (large state–
owned and medium–sized foreign bank) with the same difficulties under the
adverse scenario. In terms of the share of GDP the estimated capital injection
was larger than in the case of Croatia, accounting for 0.33% of the Serbian
GDP in 2009.
The stress tests are useful tools for the regulators and supervisors as they
can reveal potential threats to the financial stability. However, we should
bear in mind that the results should be interpreted with caution as we faced
data limitation and relatively short time series when we were constructing the
models. On the other hand the model set in the thesis is relatively simple and
intuitive and can be further developed when more data are available so that it
becomes more robust.
The thesis contributes to the current stress testing literature by analysing
the countries that are not frequently considered in the stress tests and by
covering periods prior to, during and after the recent financial crisis. As the
large part of surveys conducted the stress tests before the crisis has emerged,
recent data can show new and interesting results. Also, the simple framework
provided in the study can be applied on other emerging markets that face
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similar data limitations.
Possible extensions for the future research lie in the broadening the range
of risks that could be considered in the stress–testing framework, especially
by adding the liquidity tests and the contagion analysis. The time horizon
might be prolonged from one up to three years so that the shocks can fully
translate into the deterioration of the financial performance of the banks and
the whole system. In line with it, the attention should be paid to the problems
of the endogeneity of risk and the feedback effects. Next, it might be useful to
revise the theoretical models and variables if more data are available in order
to check the models for parameters’ instability and increase their predictive
power. Finally, in the future the stress–testing framework could be applied to
more countries, especially to the emerging markets, where the stress–testing
methods are still underdeveloped.
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Appendix A
Financial Soundness Indicators
Table A.1: Financial Soundness Indicators–Core set
Capital adequacy Regulatory capital to risk–weighted assets
Regulatory Tier 1 capital to risk–weighted assets
Nonperforming loans net of provisions to capital
Asset quality Nonperforming loans to total gross loans
Sectoral distribution of loans to total loans
Earnings Return on assets
and profitability Return on equity
Interest margin to gross income
Non–interest expenses to gross income
Liquidity Liquid assets to total assets (liquid asset ratio)
Liquid assets to short–term liabilities
Sensitivity Net open position in foreign exchange to capital
to market risk
Source: IMF, http://www.imf.org/external/np/sta/fsi/eng/fsi.htm.
A. Financial Soundness Indicators II
Table A.2: Financial Soundness Indicators–Encouraged set
Deposit–takers Capital to assets
Large exposures to capital
Geographical distribution of loans to total loans
Gross asset position in financial derivatives to cap-
ital
Gross liability position in financial derivatives to
capital
Trading income to total income
Personnel expenses to noninterest expenses
Spread between reference lending and deposit rates
Spread between highest and lowest interbank rate
Customer deposits to total (non–interbank) loans
Foreign–currency–denominated loans to total
loans
Foreign–currency–denominated liabilities to total
liabilities
Net open position in equities to capital
Other financial Assets to total financial system assets
corporations Assets to GDP
Non–financial Total debt to equity
corporations sector Return on equity
Earnings to interest and principal expenses
Net foreign exchange exposure to equity
Number of applications for protection from credi-
tors
Households Household debt to GDP
Household debt service and principal payments to
income
Market liquidity Average bid–ask spread in the securities market
Average daily turnover ratio in the securities mar-
ket
Real estate Residential real estate prices
markets Commercial real estate prices
Residential real estate loans to total loans
Commercial real estate loans to total loans
Source: IMF, http://www.imf.org/external/np/sta/fsi/eng/fsi.htm.
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B. Additional Specifications to the Credit Risk Models IV
Table B.1: Correlation coefficients for the macroeconomic variables in
Serbia.
5% critical value (two–tailed) = 0.3809 for n = 27
(using the observations Q1 2004–Q3 2010)
g srb p u ind er n
1.0000 0.3541 −0.0389 0.7037 0.2859 g srb
1.0000 0.3675 0.2655 −0.1048 p
1.0000 0.0226 0.1245 u
1.0000 0.2996 ind
1.0000 er n
er r er usd er eur i r g eu
0.2568 −0.4979 −0.3662 0.1008 0.0486 0.5831 g srb
0.1349 0.1384 0.0049 0.3020 0.1247 0.1811 p
0.3448 0.3981 0.0563 −0.1321 0.1635 0.3848 u
0.1987 −0.4922 −0.2267 −0.1068 0.0083 0.6705 ind
0.9233 −0.6679 −0.8554 −0.2975 0.2573 0.5761 er n
1.0000 −0.5105 −0.8138 −0.2375 0.3191 0.5382 er r
1.0000 0.7822 −0.0333 −0.1737 −0.2931 er usd
1.0000 −0.0453 −0.2295 −0.3028 er eur
1.0000 0.2115 −0.3869 i
1.0000 0.1768 r
1.0000 g eu
Source: Author’s computations. Annotations: g srb and g eu are GDP growths in Serbia and
the EU 15, p is inflation (PPI), u is unemployment rate growth, ind is industrial production
growth, i and r are nominal and real interest rate growths, er n, er r, er usd and er eur
are growths in nominal and real effective exchange rates and in RSD/USD and RSD/EUR
exchange rates. All variables are expressed in terms of the growth rates. The higher the
correlation coefficient for the two variables in absolute value, the greater the correlation
among these variables.
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Table B.2: Correlation coefficients for the macroeconomic variables in
Croatia–Part 1.
5% critical value (two–tailed) = 0.2973 for n = 44
(using the observations Q1 2000–Q4 2010)
g hr g eu p u er n er r er eur
1.000 0.593 0.133 −0.531 −0.402 0.259 −0.163 g hr
1.000 −0.115 0.048 −0.019 0.230 −0.304 g eu
1.000 −0.199 −0.103 −0.250 −0.203 p
1.000 0.616 −0.113 0.109 u
1.000 0.318 0.578 er n
1.000 0.161 er r
1.000 er eur
er usd i i st cp i st hh i lt cp i lt hh r
−0.473 −0.281 −0.245 −0.500 −0.220 −0.523 −0.582 g hr
−0.008 −0.298 −0.371 −0.265 −0.510 −0.569 −0.377 g eu
0.126 −0.226 −0.178 0.140 0.328 0.023 −0.431 p
0.606 −0.231 −0.347 0.251 −0.239 0.214 0.164 u
0.582 −0.208 −0.202 0.271 0.177 0.137 0.108 er n
0.073 −0.153 −0.103 −0.308 −0.020 −0.135 −0.205 er r
−0.071 0.039 0.157 0.221 0.315 0.068 0.156 er eur
1.000 −0.256 −0.283 0.105 0.051 0.261 0.195 er usd
1.000 0.940 −0.075 0.178 0.311 0.621 i
1.000 −0.110 0.284 0.282 0.615 i st cp
1.000 0.391 0.317 0.133 i st hh
1.000 0.485 0.160 i lt cp
1.000 0.385 i lt hh
1.000 r
Source: Author’s computations. Annotations: g hr and g eu are GDP growths in Croatia
and the EU 15, p is inflation (CPI), u is unemployment rate growth, er n, er r, er usd
and er eur are growths in nominal and real effective exchange rates and in RSD/USD and
RSD/EUR exchange rates, i st cp, i st hh, i lt cp and i lt hh are nominal lending interest
rates on short term and long term credits for corporates and households, and i and r are
nominal and real interest rates. All variables are expressed in terms of the growth rates.
The higher the correlation coefficient for two variables in absolute value, the greater the
correlation among these variables.
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Table B.3: Correlation coefficients for the macroeconomic variables in
Croatia–Part 2.
5% critical value (two–tailed) = 0.2973 for n = 44
(using the observations Q1 2000–Q4 2010)
r st cp r st hh r lt cp r lt hh ir spread y disp w real
0.340 −0.665 0.274 −0.664 −0.280 0.672 0.071 g hr
0.245 −0.338 0.166 −0.497 −0.331 0.619 −0.044 g eu
−0.008 −0.488 −0.006 −0.335 −0.352 0.352 −0.191 p
−0.099 0.350 −0.124 0.271 −0.115 −0.029 −0.010 u
−0.099 0.285 −0.033 0.214 −0.146 0.089 −0.017 er n
0.214 −0.215 0.195 −0.234 0.000 0.018 −0.209 er r
−0.043 0.245 0.008 0.193 −0.016 −0.058 0.170 er eur
−0.221 0.306 −0.155 0.350 −0.145 0.035 0.113 er usd
−0.097 0.278 −0.142 0.401 0.637 −0.409 0.189 i
−0.139 0.284 −0.173 0.422 0.494 −0.444 0.218 i st cp
−0.221 0.428 −0.135 0.281 −0.037 −0.225 −0.092 i st hh
−0.185 0.158 −0.083 0.291 0.244 −0.138 0.031 i lt cp
−0.181 0.373 −0.102 0.573 0.384 −0.351 0.141 i lt hh
−0.602 0.874 −0.567 0.925 0.510 −0.496 0.436 r
1.000 −0.517 0.981 −0.612 −0.067 0.206 −0.139 r st cp
1.000 −0.431 0.914 0.308 −0.472 0.406 r st hh
1.000 −0.519 −0.075 0.180 −0.087 r lt cp
1.000 0.392 −0.489 0.448 r lt hh
1.000 −0.407 0.053 ir spread
1.000 0.228 y disp
1.000 w real
Source: Author’s computations. Annotations: r st cp, r st hh, r lt cp andr lt hh are real
lending interest rates on short term and long term credits for corporates and households,
ir spread is spread between interest rates on credits and deposits, y disp is disposable income,
and w real is real wage. All variables are expressed in terms of the growth rates. The higher
the correlation coefficient for two variables in absolute value, the greater the correlation
among these variables.
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Figure B.1: Chow’s F–test for the structural break at an unknown
point for Croatia.
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Source: Author’s computations. Quandt likelihood ratio test for structural break at an
unknown point, with 15 percent trimming: structural break found at observation Q4 2004
and Q3 2005 for corporate’s model and at Q3 2004 and Q4 2006 for household’s model, both
significant at the 1% level.
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Figure B.2: Chow’s F–test for the structural break at an unknown
point for Serbia.
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Source: Author’s computations. Quandt likelihood ratio test for structural break at an
unknown point, with 15 percent trimming: structural break found at observation Q1 2009
for corporate’s model and at Q3 2008 for household’s model, both significant at the 1% level.
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Table B.4: Tests for the assumptions of the OLS model–results for the
corporate sector credit risk model in Croatia and Serbia.
Model for Croatia Test Null hypothesis P–value
Normality of residuals Shapiro–Wilk Normally distributed error 0.9725
Homoscedasticity White’s No heteroscedasticity 0.6986
Autocorrelation LMF No autocorrelation 0.2621
Model for Serbia Test Null hypothesis P–value
Normality of residuals Shapiro–Wilk Normally distributed error 0.5525
Homoscedasticity White’s No heteroscedasticity 0.2366
Autocorrelation LMF No autocorrelation 0.3529
Source: Author’s computations.
Table B.5: Tests for the assumptions of the OLS model–results for the
household sector credit risk model in Croatia and Serbia.
Model for Croatia Test Null hypothesis P–value
Normality of residuals Shapiro–Wilk Normally distributed error 0.0397
Homoscedasticity White’s No heteroscedasticity 0.7143
Autocorrelation LMF No autocorrelation 0.9013
Model for Serbia Test Null hypothesis P–value
Normality of residuals Shapiro–Wilk Normally distributed error 0.2150
Homoscedasticity White’s No heteroscedasticity 0.2560
Autocorrelation LMF No autocorrelation 0.2790
Source: Author’s computations.
Appendix C
Specification of the Stress–Testing
Results
Table C.1: Write–off rates in the Croatian and the Serbian banks.
Croatia (in %) Serbia (in %)
Bank A 19.59 12.69
Bank B 34.52 7.20
Bank C 2.43 9.80
Bank D 13.50 28.00
Bank E 0.78 N/A
Bank F 33.91 17.18
Bank G 21.91 44.84
Bank H 27.71 19.31
Bank I 15.45 2.57
Bank J – 10.64
Average 23.80 18.71
Source: Author’s computations. Data are from the individual banks’ 2009 financial reports.
In the case of Croatia, the write–off rates of Bank C and E were not counted for the average
rate due to their relatively low value. Similarly, Bank I was not considered in the Serbian
banks’ average write–off rate.
C. Specification of the Stress–Testing Results XI
Figure C.1: Portion of risks relative to the capital in the baseline sce-
nario for the Croatian banks.
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Source: Author’s computations.
Figure C.2: Portion of risks relative to the capital in the adverse sce-
nario for the Croatian banks.
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Source: Author’s computations.
C. Specification of the Stress–Testing Results XII
Figure C.3: Portion of risks relative to the capital in the baseline sce-
nario for the Serbian banks.
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Source: Author’s computations.
Figure C.4: Portion of risks relative to the capital in the adverse sce-
nario for the Serbian banks.
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Source: Author’s computations.
